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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the history of self-defense in America, in-
cluding the right to bear arms, as related to Indian tribes in order to 
shed light on how the construction of history affects tribes today.  As 
shown below, Indians are the original caricatured “savage” enemy 
against whom white Americans believed they needed militias and 
arms to defend themselves.  Since the early days, others have ably do-
cumented that the perceived enemies have multiplied to include 
African Americans, immigrants, and the lower classes.1  But this has 
not meant that Indians have been let off the hook.  Instead, they not 
only remain saddled with whites’ nightmare images of their savagery, 
but they continue to be punished for the popular perception of them 
in very concrete ways.  Specifically, they are repeatedly and increa-
singly denied the right to govern on grounds of their untrustworthi-
ness, and it is entirely possible that the lawlessness of Indian reserva-
tions has continued as a result of this very racialization. 
The Article first examines evidence that the historical meaning of 
self-defense in America (including that of the Second Amendment) 
was predicated largely on the premise that European, especially Eng-
lish, colonists needed to defend themselves against “savage” Indians.  
The Article then argues that this cultural myth2 of white America’s 
need to defend itself against Indians obscures the fact that Indians 
who engaged in armed conflicts with the United States or the colo-
nies3 were, in many instances, actually defending themselves and their 
homelands from white aggression and encroachment. 
 
 1 See, e.g., David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence:  Populists, Outgroups, and the Mul-
ticultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 469 (1999). 
 2 In using the word “myth,” I mean to invoke Richard Slotkin’s definition: 
Myths are stories drawn from a society’s history that have acquired through persis-
tent usage the power of symbolizing that society’s ideology and of dramatizing its 
moral consciousness—with all the complexities and contradictions that conscious-
ness may contain.  Over time, through frequent retellings and deployments as a 
source of interpretive metaphors, the original mythic story is increasingly conven-
tionalized and abstracted until it is reduced to a deeply encoded and resonant set 
of symbols, “icons,” “keywords,” or historical clichés.  In this form, myth becomes a 
basic constituent of linguistic meaning and of the process of both personal and so-
cial “remembering.” 
  RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION:  THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 5 (1992).  Thus, I do not use the word “myth” to describe a story that is 
known by its tellers to be false. 
 3 It is important to remember that all tribes did not engage in wars or other violent con-
flicts with the United States or the colonies.  See, e.g., Eileen Luna-Firebaugh, ‘Att Hascu 
‘Am O ‘I-oi?  What Direction Should We Take?:  The Desert People’s Approach to the Militarization 
of the Border, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 339, 346 (2005) (stating that the Tohono O’odham 
Tribe was historically, and continues to be, comprised of “peaceful farmers” who did not 
undertake wars against the United States, and therefore suggesting that the term “savage 
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The Article next argues that this self-defense mythology and the 
oppressive history that it obscures have had important historical con-
sequences for tribes and continue to have concrete consequences for 
tribes today.  These continuing consequences are largely due to the 
fact that tribes today continue to be viewed as “savage” in the popular 
imagination and by Supreme Court Justices.  The Article further ar-
gues that such consequences can be understood as a deprivation of 
the right to self-defense in a figurative sense. 
More specifically, as scholars such as Robert Williams have docu-
mented, the Supreme Court implicitly relies on this racialized charac-
terization to deny tribes their sovereign powers.  Thus, despite the 
fact that the federal and state governments no longer have statutes 
and rules in place that deny Indians the right to carry guns, in a very 
real sense Indians today lack the right to self-defense.  This is because 
tribes continue to be punished for their past efforts to defend them-
selves.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s continual abrogations of 
tribal sovereign rights render tribes and the individuals, both Indian 
and non-Indian, living on reservations virtually defenseless against 
everything from predatory lending to violent crime.  Thus, the depic-
tions of tribes as savages are depriving tribes and Indians of their 
right to self-defense in a figurative sense on a macroscopic level.  Ad-
ditionally, and relatedly, America’s cultural understanding of tribes as 
warlike savages who perpetrated aggressions on innocent white colon-
ists may well be working to subconsciously motivate the federal gov-
ernment to turn a blind eye to the horrific levels of violent crime that 
plague Indian reservations in the United States. 
The Article concludes that, as a nation, we must make an honest 
attempt to reckon with this checkered history and that, ultimately, we 
need to reevaluate both key Indian law precedents and the right to 
self-defense embodied in the Second Amendment.  At a minimum, 
Indians’ and tribes’ constitutional rights must be protected prospec-
tively, both in the context of self-defense as traditionally understood 
and more widely.  Moreover, limitations on tribal jurisdiction are, in 
many cases, grounded on notions of savagery and should be regarded 
as inherently suspect.  Finally, as a society we must question all of our 
assumptions about tribes and Indians. 
 
tribes” in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo should not be understood to refer to the To-
hono O’odham); see also Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United 
States, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 274 (2001) (suggesting that peaceful tribes, i.e., 
those that had not made war on the United States, were less likely to be federally recog-
nized because they may well have been completely unknown to the U.S. government). 
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A. Definitions of “Self-Defense” 
The term “self-defense” has both an individual and a collective 
meaning, and the jurisprudence of the Second Amendment has va-
ried its focus between the two meanings.  On an individual level, “self-
defense” refers to “[t]he use of force to protect oneself, one’s family, 
or one’s property from a real or threatened attack.”4  On a collective 
level, under international law the right of  “self-defense” allows a na-
tion to respond with force when an armed attack occurs, and may al-
so allow the use of force to repel an imminent attack.5  For tribes, col-
lective self-defense has historically been more important, but, as 
shown below, federal, state, and colonial governments have historical-
ly sought to prevent individual Indians from bearing arms, presuma-
bly to thwart the exercise of tribes’ collective right to self-defense. 
In this Article, I also use the term “self-defense” more broadly, as a 
constitutive role of government, and accordingly examine what as-
pects of sovereignty are necessary to a government’s ability to defend 
its people from crime and other types of depredations. 
B. The Second Amendment 
By protecting the right to bear arms, the Second Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution codifies the right to self-defense on either an 
individual or a collective level, or on both levels, depending on one’s 
interpretation.  It provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being ne-
cessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”6 
In terms of original intent, the first portion of the Second 
Amendment, from “[a] well regulated militia” through “free state,” 
appears to have been designed to protect against the potential tyran-
ny of the federal government, specifically the tyranny that would oc-
cur if the federal government were to use a standing army to oppress 
 
 4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1481 (9th ed. 2009). 
 5 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Secu-
rity Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 51, 58 (2001); accord BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY supra note 4, at 1481 (defining “self-defense” under international law as 
“[t]he right of a state to defend itself against a real or threatened attack”); see also Thomas 
M. Franck, What Happens Now?  The United States After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 611 
(2003) (discussing the possibility that the right of “self-defense” under the U.N. Charter 
has come “through practice, to include a right of action against an imminent (as opposed 
to an actual) armed attack”). 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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unarmed state citizens.7  As for the second portion, relating to “the 
right . . . to keep and bear Arms,” there is disagreement as to whether 
this confers an individual right or only a collective right.  Those who 
see the Second Amendment as conferring a collective right view the 
right to bear arms as pertaining solely to militia service and, there-
fore, sometimes argue that the Amendment is now defunct.8  By con-
trast, the traditional individual rights view of the Amendment was 
that because the militia was comprised of all adult white male citizens 
and arguably existed independently of the legislature, every person 
has an implicit individual right to bear arms.9  By the mid-1990s, how-
ever, scholars had begun to construe the second clause of the 
Amendment, protecting the right of the people to bear arms, as di-
vorced in meaning from the first clause, which relates to militia ser-
vice.10  Therefore, such scholars concluded that there was an individ-
ual right to bear arms that was unrelated to militia service. 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,11 the Supreme Court adopted this 
latter-day individualist understanding of the Second Amendment, 
thus enshrining as constitutional law the individual’s right to bear 
arms “to defend himself and his family from criminals.”12  More re-
markably, the Heller Court stated that military-style arms could be re-
gulated or even prohibited consistently with the Amendment, and 
therefore sanctioned restrictions on the use of arms for the militia 
purposes that had previously been thought to be the core of the 
Second Amendment.13 
 
 7 See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment:  The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 103, 144, 150–51 (2000) (discussing ratifier intent and the concerns of Anti-
federalists and Federalists generally); H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, Muting the 
Second Amendment:  The Disappearance of the Constitutional Militia, in THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 148, 149 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) (discussing the 
principal drafters’ intent).   
 8 See, e.g., Ulliver & Merkel, supra note 7, at 150, 178 (concluding that “the Second 
Amendment has no voice in the matter of gun regulation”); Williams, supra note 1, at 
393–94 (“[T]he right to arms does belong to every individual citizen, but only if they are 
united into a coherent revolutionary people.  As I do not believe that Americans presently 
comprise such a citizenry, I do not believe that the Amendment applies to modern condi-
tions, by its own frame of reference.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365, 1372–73 (1993); Don 
B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 204, 214 (1983); Rakove, supra note 7, at 111. 
 10 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191, 239–240 & n.250 (2008). 
 11 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 12 Siegel, supra note 10, at 239. 
 13 Id. at 199–200, 239; accord Maxine Burkett, Much Ado About . . . Something Else:  D.C. v. Hel-
ler, the Racialized Mythology of the Second Amendment, and Gun Policy Reform, 12 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 57, 66 (2008) (“[T]he Heller majority departed from earlier precedent and 
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While these differing interpretations of the Second Amendment 
are not central to this Article, a working understanding of them 
should aid in comprehending various scholars’ arguments.  What is 
essential to understand is (1) that the Second Amendment codifies 
some portion of the broader right to self-defense, although there is 
little agreement as to whether it is a collective or an individual right, 
or both; and (2) that the right to bear arms in particular, and the 
right to self-defense generally, have historically been denied to tribes 
as a result of the perception of them as savage, a perception that 
stems in significant part from their past acts of self-defense and which 
has continuing effects on tribes today. 
C. The Justices’ Perceptions of Tribes in District of Columbia v. Heller 
In Heller, as noted above, a divided Supreme Court held that the 
Second Amendment included an individual right to defend oneself 
with a handgun and therefore struck down the District of Columbia’s 
general ban on possession of handguns.14  In oral argument for the 
case, Justice Kennedy interrupted counsel for the District of Colum-
bia during his argument that the Second Amendment right was li-
mited to the military context.  The Justice then inquired whether the 
Amendment had “nothing to do with the concern of the remote sett-
ler to defend himself and his family against hostile Indian tribes and 
outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that.”15  Several 
tribal advocates and Indian law scholars found Justice Kennedy’s clas-
sification of tribes with “outlaws, wolves[,] and bears” troubling, but 
those outside of the Indian law field seemed to miss the racialized 
implications of the question even as they extrapolated the racialized 
historical underpinnings of the Amendment vis-à-vis African Ameri-
cans.16 
 
found, unequivocally, an individual right to bear arms for ‘traditionally lawful’ purposes, 
such as self-defense within the home.  Most notably, the Court found that this individual 
right was unconnected to militia service. . . . The Court’s reasoning focused disproportio-
nately on the structure of the Amendment, finding that the Amendment is ‘naturally’ di-
vided into two parts—a prefatory clause and an operative clause.  Importantly for the 
Court, the prefatory clause regarding the militia does not limit or expand the operative 
clause. . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 14 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822. 
 15 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290). 
 16 Compare Comments of Turtle Talk, Justice Kennedy:  “Hostile Indians” May Have Been a Moti-
vating Factor for 2nd Amendment, TURTLE TALK, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2008/
03/19/justice-kennedy-hostile-indians-may-have-been-a-motivating-factor-for-2nd-
amendment/ (Mar. 19 2008, 2:21 PM) (excerpting the oral argument in which several 
commenters described Justice Kennedy’s reference to “hostile Indian tribes” in this con-
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This cultural blindness regarding the racialization of American 
Indians is also reflected in the Court’s opinion in Heller, when the 
Court discusses the historical disarmament of African Americans and 
when it quotes a speech by the nineteenth-century politician Charles 
Sumner.  In the Heller opinion, the majority recounts instances of 
African Americans being systematically disarmed and statutory and 
constitutional attempts to remedy that problem, many of which were 
based on Second Amendment justifications, without mentioning In-
dians being denied the right to bear arms.17  More blatantly, to sup-
port its claim that anti-slavery advocates often invoked the right to 
bear arms for self-defense, the Court quotes an 1856 speech by the 
politician Charles Sumner in which Indians are described as one of 
the chief reasons that pioneers needed arms:  “The rifle has ever 
been the companion of the pioneer and, under God, his tutelary pro-
tector against the red man and the beast of the forest.”18  This quote 
not only racializes Indians by grouping them with animals, but by the 
use of the term “under God,” it portrays disputes between Indians 
and settlers as struggles between evil and good.  Yet the loaded cha-
 
text as “disturbing” or “illuminating”), with Stephanie Mencimer, Whitewashing the Second 
Amendment, MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/03/white
washing-second-amendment (Mar. 19 2008, 11:00 PM) (quoting Justice Kennedy’s allu-
sion to “hostile Indian tribes” but ignoring the racialized implications of the statement 
and instead deploring the Court’s failure to reckon with the Second Amendment racia-
lized history with respect to African Americans).  Classification of Indians with wolves (or 
rather conflation of Indians with wolves) is a longstanding practice with roots dating back 
to the Puritans.  See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American 
Law and Culture:  Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 
1268 (1992) (“Cotton Mather and other Puritan writers called Indians wolves, lions, sor-
cerers, and demons possessed by Satan.”). 
 17 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2808–11; see also Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 67, 79 (1991) (describing firearms prohibitions directed at Native 
Americans as being used to “oppress and . . . exterminate” them, and noting that restric-
tions on blacks owning arms “were abolished, at least facially, during Reconstruction,” 
whereas those pertaining to Indians remained in place long after).  To be completely fair 
to the Heller Court, it should be acknowledged that the Court was recounting the histori-
cal disarmament of African Americans in large part to support its conclusion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment and other post-Second Amendment laws encompassed an indi-
vidualized understanding of the right to self-defense, a conclusion that the Court saw as 
bearing on the original intent of the Second Amendment.  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2808–11.  
The Fourteenth Amendment and the other legal provisions discussed appear not to have 
been intended to protect Indian tribes or Indian individuals.  See id.; see also DAVID H. 
GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 163–64 (5th ed. 2005) 
(addressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s inapplicability to Indians, particularly its citi-
zenship provision).  Thus, there was arguably no reason to bring them up.  On the other 
hand, however, the lack of historical and current concern for tribes’ and Indians’ right to 
self-defense and their right to bear arms speaks volumes about America’s failure to reck-
on with its injustices against tribes and Indians. 
 18 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2807 (internal citation omitted). 
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racter of the words is not even mentioned in the majority opinion.  
Similarly, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion alludes, albeit in a 
somewhat more neutral fashion than Justice Kennedy’s oral argu-
ment question or the Court’s quotation of Charles Sumner, to the 
fact that “[t]wo hundred years ago, most Americans, many living on 
the frontier, would likely have thought of self-defense primarily in 
terms of outbreaks of fighting with Indian tribes, rebellions such as Shays’ 
Rebellion, marauders, and crime-related dangers to travelers on the 
roads, on footpaths, or along waterways.”19  In Justice Breyer’s dissent, 
Indians are one group in a list of sources of conflict that allegedly 
precipitated the early Americans’ need for self-defense.  They thus 
are monolithically portrayed as a force to defend against and there-
fore implicitly lack a right to self-defense in their own right. 
D.  Erasure of Tribes in McDonald v. City of Chicago 
Like Heller, the Court’s most recent gun rights opinion, McDonald 
v. City of Chicago,20 demonstrates a cultural blindness regarding the 
historical abrogation of tribal and individual Indians’ self-defense 
rights.  The McDonald opinion extensively reviews the history of Afri-
can American disarmament21 but completely ignores the similar his-
tory with respect to Native Americans.  While the history of the dis-
armament of African Americans is clearly relevant to McDonald’s 
holding that the Second Amendment had been incorporated against 
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
the utter lack of cognizance of Native American disarmament re-
mains striking. 
Heller’s assumption that Indian tribes were one of the paramount 
reasons that colonists and early Americans needed to engage in self-
defense generally, and needed guns specifically, runs throughout the 
literature on the Second Amendment and the colonial history of 
America.22  This Article explores that assumption and asks what it 
 
 19 Id. at 2866 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  While this statement may well be 
correct as to the concerns of the settlers, without further explanation or qualification, it 
reflects and perpetuates a view of tribes as dangerous entities that needed to be defended 
against. 
 20 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 21 Id. at 3038–43. 
 22 The right to self-defense also has a racially charged history with respect to African Ameri-
cans, and this history has received significant scholarly attention in recent years.  See, e.g., 
Burkett, supra note 13, at 86; Robert T. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second 
Amendment:  Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 323-26 (1991); 
Williams, supra note 1, at 447.  While this history provides important context for the right 
to self-defense, delineating how slave revolts came to be a central concern of militias in 
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means for the way Indian tribes are viewed in society today and how 
the assumption and the continuing racialized view of tribes it embo-
dies affect tribal rights. 
II.  THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE COLONISTS’ NEED FOR SELF-DEFENSE 
As discussed below, Indian attacks were the primary reason that 
militias were initially formed, and throughout the colonial era, mili-
tias were understood to be necessary to protect against Indian attacks 
(although, as time went on, protection against slave revolts became 
another pressing goal of the militias).23  As explained below, however, 
the monolithic notion of Indians as the aggressors in armed conflicts 
was actually constructed subconsciously to justify the actions of colon-
ists in perpetrating aggressions against tribes and in confiscating their 
lands. 
Militias were not only a central part of the colonies’ (and later the 
states’ and federal government’s) mechanisms for collective self-
defense, but they are also crucial to understanding the original intent 
of the Second Amendment.  Because militias are a core aspect (or 
perhaps the core) of the Second Amendment,24 the fact that they 
were developed in large part to fight Indian tribes under the rubric 
of defending against their aggressions suggests that tribes have histor-
ically been constructed as a caricatured “other” that European colon-
ists, and then white American citizens, needed to defend against, ra-
ther than as active subjects with their own right to self-defense. 
 
early American history and how later gun control efforts were often aimed at disarming 
African Americans, this Article focuses primarily on the lesser known (and complementa-
ry) story of how the right to self-defense has operated with respect to Indian tribes. 
 23 See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 9, at 1371. 
 24 Both scholars who espouse the traditional individual rights view of the Amendment and 
those who adhere to the collective rights view acknowledge the centrality of the militia.  
Compare id. at 1372 (stating that “any constitutional right to bear arms is directly related 
to” the militia), with Kates, supra note 9, at 213 (“[T]he individual right advocate may ac-
cept the state’s right theory and simply assert that, even though one of the 
[A]mendment’s purposes may have been to protect the states’ militias, another was to 
protect the individual right to arms.  Indeed, the evidence suggests it was precisely by pro-
tecting the individual that the Framers intended to protect the militia.” (footnote omit-
ted)).  For a cogent argument that the constitutional right to bear arms is now defunct 
because it was based on a late-eighteenth-century conception of militia service that has 
since become completely archaic, see Ulliver & Merkel, supra note 7, at 148–49. 
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A. The Colonial Concept of Self-Defense Related Directly to Tribes 
As David Williams has explained, “Americans . . . came to love 
guns through hating Indians.”25  Thus, “at [its] most macroscopic lev-
el, it is possible to understand the Second Amendment as an icon of 
the imperial expansion of . . . European culture.”26  Indeed, many 
scholars agree that the militia “[o]riginally . . . was meant to protect 
white settler communities from Native Americans.”27 
It should come as no surprise, then, that prior to the formation of 
the Republic, British colonies, such as those in Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
and Massachusetts, appear to have been predominantly concerned 
with what they perceived as defending themselves against unjustified 
attacks by Indians.  Virginia, for instance, passed a statute in 1655–56 
that outlawed the “shoot[ing] of any gunns at drinkeing (marriages 
and ffuneralls onely excepted) [sic].”28  The reason for the law was 
that “gunshots were the common alarm of Indian attack,”29 “of which 
no certainty can be had in respect of the frequent shooting of guns in 
drinking.”30  Moreover, while in the 1600s Virginia had prohibited 
slaves and free blacks from carrying arms, by the 1700s the colony al-
 
 25 Williams, supra note 1, at 469. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Burkett, supra note 13, at 86; accord Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 22, at 323–24 (“For 
the settlers of British North America, an armed and universally deputized white popula-
tion was necessary not only to ward off dangers from the armies of other European pow-
ers, but also to ward off attacks from the indigenous population which feared the en-
croachment of English settlers on their lands.”); Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473, 474–75 (1914) (“In the American colo-
nies, with their small revenues and beset as they were with savage and other enemies, it 
was deemed necessary that every man of military age and capacity should provide himself 
with arms and be ready to bear them in defense of himself and his neighbors and the co-
lony at large.”); see also Bogus, supra note 9, at 1371 n.37 (“In 1633, for example, every 
man in the Plymouth county was required to own a musket, two pounds of powder, and 
ten pounds of bullets.” (citation omitted)); Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves:  
The Original Understanding of the Right to Bear Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041, 1047 (2007) 
(“Pennsylvanians were less concerned with an individual right to bear arms than they 
were with the responsibility of the provincial government to enable them to protect 
themselves on the frontier.”); Williams, supra note 1, at 469 (“Americans came to cherish 
the right to arms. . . . [because they] lived in a frontier society.”). 
 28 1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 
401–02 (1823). 
 29 Clayton Cramer, Gun Control in the Middle and Southern Colonies,  
http://www.claytoncramer.com/popular/MiddleSouthernColonialGunControl.PDF (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2011); see also HENING, supra note 28, at 401 (“[T]he common enemie the 
Indians, if opportunity serve, would suddenly invade this collony to a totall subversion of 
the same, and whereas the only means of discovery of their plotts is by al-
larms [sic] . . . .”). 
 30 1 HENING, supra note 28, at 401. 
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lowed limited ownership of guns by African Americans in part so that 
they could “help defend frontier plantations against attacks by hostile 
Indians.”31  Similarly, in 1633, the Plymouth Colony, located in what 
became Massachusetts, required every man “to own a musket, two 
pounds of powder, and ten pounds of bullets” to enable the colony to 
defend itself against Indians.32  Finally, in the mid- to late-1700s, 
Pennsylvania experienced sharp internal conflicts as a result of popu-
lar resentment against the ruling Quaker government’s policy of “pa-
cifism and negotiation with Natives.”33  These conflicts, which ulti-
mately resulted in the ousting of the pacifist Quakers from the 
colonial government, led first to organization of local militias, then 
later to the passage of an Assembly bill in 1763 authorizing payment 
of up to 700 volunteers to protect the backcountry during harvest, 
and finally to the passage of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 
1776, “which guaranteed that the people had a right to bear arms ‘for 
the defense of themselves.’”34  Other colonies also formed informal 
local militias to “ward off Indian attacks,” especially during the period 
of the French and Indian War, which lasted from 1754–63.35 
And, most recently, the myth that Indians were a primary reason 
that colonists needed to defend themselves was perpetuated in Heller 
in:  (1) Justice Kennedy’s oral argument question as to whether the 
Second Amendment had “nothing to do with the concern of the re-
mote settler to defend himself and his family against hostile Indian 
tribes and outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies”;36 (2) the Court’s 
quotation of Charles Sumner’s speech37 without any qualification or 
explanation; and (3) Justice Breyer’s statement in dissent that “[t]wo 
hundred years ago, most Americans, many living on the frontier, 
would likely have thought of self-defense primarily in terms of out-
breaks of fighting with Indian tribes,” as well as other sources of con-
 
 31 Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 22, at 325. 
 32 Bogus, supra note 9, at 1371 n.37 (citation omitted). 
 33 Kozuskanich, supra note 27, at 1046. 
 34 Id. at 1042, 1049, 1050–51, 1061; cf. PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS:  HOW INDIAN 
WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA 108 (2008) (describing the retreat of many Quakers 
from government during this period as a “push-me-pull-you process” born in part from 
their being chased out of government by their opponents largely as a result of perceived 
“Quaker-Indian intimacy,” but noting that this retreat from government was also viewed 
as a desirable affirmation of virtue by some Quakers). 
 35 Kozuskanich, supra note 27, at 1067. 
 36 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) 
(No. 07-290). 
 37 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2807 (2008) (using the quoted passage 
as evidence that the prevailing view in 1856 was that the Second Amendment protected 
the right to self-defense against “the red man”). 
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flict.38  Because the Second Amendment grew directly out of Ameri-
cans’ colonial experiences of defending themselves through militias, 
these colonial laws regarding arms-bearing and the colonies’ use of 
militias to ward off perceived Indian attacks are directly relevant to 
the Amendment.39 
B. The Perception of Indians as Aggressors 
The monolithic perception that Indians were the aggressors was 
necessarily colored by the colonist and early American point of view,40 
and, as explained below, it was largely inaccurate.41  In fact, the set-
tlers (undoubtedly subconsciously) constructed their perception of 
Indians as aggressors and savages largely to justify their own violent 
actions against Indians.42  Richard Slotkin explains that “[t]he pre-
mise of the ‘savage war’ is that ineluctable political and social differ-
ences . . . make coexistence between primitive natives and civilized 
Europeans impossible on any basis other than that of subjugation.”43  
 
 38 Id. at 2866 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The Supreme Court’s most recent Second Amend-
ment case, McDonald v. City of Chicago, does not directly reference Indian tribes.  Howev-
er, Justice Stevens’ mention, in dissent, of “invaders” as one of the primary concerns that 
motivated the enactment of the Second Amendment may well have been meant to in-
clude Indian tribes.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3107 n.33 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).  Of course describing tribes as “invaders” would be ironic, although 
no irony appears to have been intended. 
 39 Accord Rakove, supra note 7, at 118 (stating, in reference to the Second Amendment, “that 
the ways in which Americans conceived of and formulated rights were a product not just 
of what they had inherited [from British thinking] but of what they had experienced” 
during the colonial era). 
 40 See, e.g., R. DAVID EDMUNDS, THE SHAWNEE PROPHET, at x (1983) (“[D]ifferent peoples 
interpret the same events within their own particular cultural framework. . . . [B]oth In-
dians and white Americans were the products of their own cultures and had difficulty in 
comprehending each others’ perspective.”); KERWIN LEE KLEIN, FRONTIERS OF 
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION:  NARRATING THE EUROPEAN CONQUEST OF NATIVE AMERICA, 
1890–1900, at 5–6 (1997) (explaining that we evaluate stories, including historical stories, 
from “within narrative traditions we can interweave with others but never entirely escape” 
and that “an inquiry into historical knowledge can only be a ‘sociohistorical account of 
how various people have tried to reach agreement on what to believe’”) (quoting Richard 
Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity? in RELATIVISM:  INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 35–50 
(Michael Krausz ed. 1989)); see also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY:  AN INTRODUCTION 28–29 (2001) (explaining that “we are all our stock of narra-
tives–the terms, preconceptions, scripts, and understandings that we use to make sense of 
the world”). 
 41 This is not to say that colonists did not genuinely fear Indians.  In fact, there seems to 
have been a widespread fear of Indians among white colonists in at least some areas.  See, 
e.g., Silver, supra note 34, at xxv, 43, 45, 47–48, 60, 129, 160 (describing such fear among 
mid-Atlantic colonists in the mid- and late-1700s). 
 42 SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
 43 Id. 12. 
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Thus, because of the perceived “‘savage’ and bloodthirsty propensity 
of the natives, such struggles inevitably become ‘wars of extermina-
tion.’”44  He further explains that: 
  In its most typical formulations, the myth of “savage war” blames Na-
tive Americans as instigators of a war of extermination.  Indians were cer-
tainly aggressors in particular cases, and they often asserted the right to 
exclude settlers from particular regions.  But . . . [t]he accusation is bet-
ter understood as an act of psychological projection that made the In-
dians scapegoats for the morally troubling side of American expansion:  
the myth of “savage war” became a basic ideological convention of a cul-
ture that was itself increasingly devoted to the extermination or expropr-
iation of the Indians and the kidnaping [sic] and enslavement of black 
Africans.45 
Other historians have confirmed Professor Slotkin’s view.  For ex-
ample, Francis Paul Prucha recounts how: 
In the very beginning, the natives received the English colonists hospita-
bly, greeted them with signs of friendship, and supplied them with food.  
But the image of savagism in the minds of the Europeans included a 
strong element of treachery on the part of the savages, and English beha-
vior toward the Indians soon brought real enmity to the surface.46 
On a more general level, Richard White summarizes the extent to 
which the dominant American perception of Indians, both historical 
and contemporary, has varied and continues to vary from the reality 
of Indian cultures and existence, thus resulting in inaccurate portray-
als of tribes: 
The American Republic succeeded in doing what the French and English 
empires could not do.  Americans invented Indians and forced Indians to 
live with the consequences of this invention. . . . Europeans met the oth-
er, invented a long-lasting and significant common world, but in the end 
reinvented the Indian as other.  Ever since, we have seen the history of 
the colonial and early republican period through that prism of other-
ness.47 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 12–13. 
 46 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER:  THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS 12–13 (1984). 
 47 RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND:  INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT 
LAKES REGION, 1650–1815, at xv (1991)  The point here is not to assign blame to either 
the colonists or the Indians.  It is perhaps relatively easy to understand the colonists’ de-
sire to displace the Indians, given the rigid religious outlook many of them ascribed to 
and the irrevocable investment they had made in traveling to the New World.  Converse-
ly, one can readily understand why the Indians wanted to retain their cultures, lands, and 
livelihoods.  But the insights possible as a result of our standpoint of over one hundred 
and fifty years removal from this history can help us develop a broader, more inclusive 
perspective and ultimately facilitate our engaging in more humane actions. 
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Defining one’s opponents as savages in order to justify savage 
treatment of them is not unique to the American colonial expe-
rience.48  Rather, Frédéric Mégret describes how this same motif has 
played out from the inception of the international law of war in the 
late 1800s until the present to exclude non-Western peoples from the 
protective reach of the law of war by defining them as “savages.”49  
Thus, as Mégret argues, “international humanitarian law has always 
had an ‘other’—an ‘other’ that is both a figure excluded from the 
various categories of protection, and an elaborate metaphor of what 
the laws of war do not want to be.”50  Accordingly, describing non-
Europeans as “savages” has allowed European countries to argue con-
vincingly that they do not need to honor the laws of war when fight-
ing with such peoples and, thus, that they may instigate war against 
them for any reason whatsoever and that anything is permissible in 
such wars.51  The justification for these exclusions was generally that 
the so-called savages would not themselves honor the laws of war52 
and, thus, that inhumane measures, such as expanding bullets, could 
be rightfully used against them.53  Notably, some Americans used 
America’s colonial experience with Indian tribes to justify the exclu-
sion of purportedly savage peoples from the protections of interna-
 
 48 One very recent example of this use of savage imputations involves accusations of war 
crimes by U.S. soldiers stationed in Afghanistan.  A U.S. soldier accused of mastermind-
ing three killings of Afghan civilians is said to have “had pure hatred for all Afghanis and 
[to have] constantly referred to them as savages.”  Gene Johnson, Hearing Begins in Alleged 
Plot to Murder Afghans, COMCAST.NET NEWS, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.comcast.net/
articles/news-national/20100927/US.Afghan.Probe/. 
 49 See generally Frédéric Mégret, From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’:  A Postcolonial Look at 
International Humanitarian Law’s ‘Other,’ in INTERNATIONAL LAW & ITS OTHERS 266–67 
(Ann Orford, ed. 2006) (arguing that international laws of war were both inclusive and 
exclusive in providing protection). 
 50 Id. at 266; accord Eliga H. Gould, Zones of Law, Zones of Violence:  The Legal Geography of the 
British Atlantic, circa 1772, 60 WM. & MARY Q. 471, 479, 483 (2003) (explaining that the 
British Atlantic Colonies in the 1700s were perceived as being beyond the purview of in-
ternational customary law and that this led to a license for violence against Indians as well 
as against competing colonists). 
 51 See Mégret, supra note 49, at 269 (quoting Sven Lindqvist to demonstrate that Europeans 
believed that the laws of war did not apply to “savages and barbarians”). 
 52 See id. at 289, 293–94 (discussing how “civilized nations” feared that because the “non-
civilized” were unable or unwilling to adhere to the laws of war, they would gain a tactical 
advantage).  This concern was also voiced by colonists in reference to their conflicts with 
Indians; specifically, mid-Atlantic colonists viewed the Indians’ methods of attack and 
choices of victims as violating emerging international law norms regarding the laws of 
war, norms about which the Indians undoubtedly knew little, if anything.  SILVER, supra 
note 34, at 57–60. 
 53 See Mégret, supra note 49, at 281 (quoting Lord Lansdowne, who defended his decision to 
have two types of ammunition on the ground that the use of expanding bullets would be 
necessary when dealing with “savages”). 
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tional law.54  Taking the myth of the savage war with Indian tribes as 
an earlier instance of what was to occur with the exclusionary devel-
opment of the international law of war provides further evidence that 
Indian tribes could not have been envisioned to have any right to self-
defense because such rights were reserved for so-called civilized na-
tions. 
III.  THE HISTORY THAT AMERICA’S DOMINANT HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
OBSCURES 
Although colonial America perceived the Indian populations as 
making unprovoked cruel attacks on white settlers, it must be re-
membered that the Indians who engaged in armed conflicts with the 
United States and its predecessor colonies were in many instances de-
fending their homelands from confiscation.55  The struggle to main-
tain these homelands was particularly crucial for tribes, given the pre-
valent colonialist view that Indians and settlers could not coexist56 and 
the lack of respect that most English colonists and, later, Americans 
showed for Indian land rights.57  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how 
 
 54 See id. at 292 (describing how one American concluded from American colonial expe-
rience that “devastation and annihilation [was] the principle method of warfare that sa-
vage tribes [knew]”). 
 55 See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 12 (“The [English colonists’] replacement of the In-
dians on the land became the basis for the enduring conflict with the Indians who re-
mained, and Indian wars marked the English experience as they did that of the United 
States.”). 
 56 See, e.g., SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that the underlying premise of a “savage war” 
is the view that coexistence between the natives and the civilized Europeans is impossi-
ble).  This view that Indians and whites could not coexist is graphically demonstrated in 
the 1881 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  See Cuthair v. Montezu-
ma-Cortez, Colo. Sch. Dist. No. Re-1, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158 (D. Colo. 1998) 
(“‘[S]avage and civilized life’ cannot live and prosper together.  One of the two must die.  
If the Indians were to be a civilized people and become happy and prosperous, he [the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs] felt they should learn our language and adopt our mod-
es and ways of life.” (quoting HIRAM PRICE, COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1881)). 
 57 See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (holding that underly-
ing fee title to Indian lands came to be vested in the European colony that first discov-
ered the lands by virtue of the “discovery”); PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 14 (“The suprema-
cy of the cultivator over the hunter was a classic weapon in the arsenal of the 
dispossessors.”); SILVER, supra note 34, at 8 (quoting a 1741 letter from a group of Dela-
ware Indians to Pennsylvania’s governor regarding the settlers’ encroachment on their 
lands and their fear of defending their lands because of threats of violence); Gould, supra 
note 46, at 499 (describing the fiction underlying the Proclamation of 1763 that the Brit-
ish colonies of that time were located on what had been vacant land that the indigenous 
inhabitants had no want of “and of which they make no actual and constant use” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between 
the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara:  Notes Toward a Blueprint for 
 
704 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
a continent peopled by numerous nations that had inhabited it for 
thousands of years could be taken over, and the nations displaced, 
without the colonists experiencing violent repercussions.  However, 
such repercussions were nevertheless taken as evidence of the In-
dians’ irrepressibly violent tendencies and were used as an excuse for 
violent retaliation.58 
There are countless examples of tribes’ being deprived of their 
land by whites and attempting to defend themselves against the 
losses.59  Below, a few colonial examples are discussed, followed by 
 
the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 665–67 
(2009) (explaining the doctrine of discovery as formulated in Johnson v. M’Intosh); see also 
SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 40 (1973).  Slotkin quotes the New York World of January 18, 
1874, as follows: 
[The Indians] have their choice of incorporation with the general mass of the 
population and a life of civilized industry, which in the great majority of instances 
they decline to lead, or else of betaking themselves to such regions as are not 
needed for the maintenance of civilized men, there to remain unmolested until ei-
ther the land they live on s [sic] needed, in which case they must be removed, or 
else they issue from it to molest civilized settlers, in which case they must be pu-
nished with death if no less penalty will avail.  The country is not yet so crowded 
that the Indian must be told to work or die; but it is so crowded that he must be 
told to behave himself or die. 
  Id. at 40–41 (quoting Our Indian Policy, N.Y. WORLD, Jan. 18, 1874, at 4). 
 Thus, it appears that, in 1874, one prominent view was that Indians had no right to 
their land at all once it was “needed” by whites.  Under this mind-set, Indians only existed 
at the sufferance of the dominant white society. 
 On the other hand, the sharp contrast between the colonists’ Lockean views of prop-
erty rights and the collective or communal understanding of those rights among Native 
Americans undoubtedly led to misunderstandings on the part of the colonists as to 
whether Indians claimed ownership.  See, e.g., Honor Brabazon, Property Rights and Impe-
rialism–Then and Now:  Contemporary Private Property Rights Discourse in Historical Context 8–9 
(May 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the Natives’ 
and colonists’ differing conceptions of property in colonial America). 
 58 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1] (2009) (“When tribes rose up 
in violence against what they perceived as unjustified intrusions on their land, as they did 
in the Pequot War of 1637 and King Philip’s War of 1675, these attacks were taken as 
cause for just wars against them, with dispossession of Indian property by conquest in re-
prisal.”) 
   A popular Indian view of the tribal role in protecting their homelands from colonial 
attack is vividly demonstrated by the contemporary t-shirts that picture small groups of 
armed Indians and read “Homeland Security:  Fighting Terrorism Since 1492.”  COYOTES 
CORNER, http://www.coyotescorner.com/tshirts-hs.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).  Yet 
even these t-shirts have been virulently attacked by whites, presumably because they 
threaten to disrupt the dominant view of colonial history.  See Joseph Farah, Fighting Ter-
rorism Since 1492, HUMAN EVENTS.COM (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.humanevents.com/
article.php?id=17364. 
 59 While I generally use the term “white” to describe European colonists, racialized notions 
of whiteness and Indianness probably did not fully develop among Americans of Euro-
pean descent until late in the eighteenth century.  See, e.g., SILVER, supra note 34, at 114–
123 (discussing the evolution of racialized ideas of whiteness and Indianness in the mid-
Atlantic colonies). 
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some later examples.  However, as the later examples illustrate, as 
time wore on, Indians increasingly lacked the military force even to 
make viable attempts at self-defense.60 
At the same time, it is important to remember that tribes that en-
gaged in armed conflicts were not uniformly acting in a posture of 
self-defense.61  Rather, American colonial history is an exceedingly 
complex web, the complexity of which has been obscured by the mo-
nolithic view of tribes as historical aggressors that we inherited from 
our colonial roots.62  In attempting to tell part of the story that has 
been largely overlooked, I do not mean to imply that this is the entire 
story or to replace one monolithic view of tribes with another. 
A. Pre-Nineteenth-Century Examples of Tribal Acts of Self-Defense 
Francis Paul Prucha explains that “as the English expanded, en-
croaching upon Indian lands and in many cases treating the inhabi-
tants despicably, the Indians resisted with force.”63  He then details 
several instances of seventeenth-century conflicts that had their origin 
in Indian attempts to preserve their land-bases against white en-
croachment.  The first occurred in 1622 in Virginia, “in which the 
Indians under Opechancanough rose up against white settlers who 
had invaded their lands and quickly killed a quarter to one-third of 
the population.”64  This revolt was then “used as an excuse for massive 
retaliation against the Indians” and was “looked upon as proof that 
 
 60 See SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that, with one possible exception, “after 1700, no 
tribe or group of tribes pursued (or was capable of pursuing) a general ‘policy’ of exter-
minating or removing White settlements on a large-scale basis”). 
 61 See, e.g., id. (acknowledging that “Indians were certainly aggressors in particular cases”); 
see also JOHN DEMOS, THE UNREDEEMED CAPTIVE:  A FAMILY STORY FROM EARLY AMERICA 4 
(1994) (alluding to instances in the colonial Northeast of Indians’ capturing colonists 
and of some of these captives coming to prefer Indian ways).  Additionally, European ex-
pansion into the Americas had complex effects on tribes that hinder attempts to simply 
categorize even individual tribal actions as acts of aggression or defense.  See, e.g., WHITE, 
supra note 47, at xv (“The wars of the Iroquois proper, or the Five (later Six) Nations, [in 
the mid-seventeenth century] were . . . a result of changes as complicated as I present 
here.  The reader should not mistake their warfare for ‘normal’ Indian warfare in North 
America.  It, too, was a complex product of European expansion.”) 
 62 In addition to the colonists’ and Indians’ differing conceptions of property rights, anoth-
er factor that complicated land disputes between the tribes and the colonists was that, in 
some cases, individual Indians would claim authority to speak on behalf of tribes and sell 
tribal lands when, in fact, they lacked such authority.  See, e.g., Eric Kades, The Dark Side of 
Efficiency:  Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1065, 1083 (2000) (describing examples where agreements for the purchase of land 
were made by individual Indians without the approval of all members of a tribe). 
 63 PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 13. 
 64 Id. 
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Indians could not be trusted.”65  The Pequot War of 1637 was also 
born from a land dispute between the Indians and the English; it re-
sulted from English attempts to expand the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
into the Connecticut River Valley and the Pequots’ resistance to those 
attempts.66  King Philip’s War of 1675–1676, in which a “confedera-
tion of formerly friendly tribes” drove the New England colonies 
“nearly to the brink of destruction,”67 is similarly described by Prucha 
as “furnish[ing] still another case of warfare instigated by Indians in a 
desperate attempt to stop the advancing tide of English settlement.”68  
However, Prucha’s description of the war’s having been instigated by 
the tribes is contested.  Several figures of the day, including Rhode 
Island’s deputy governor, John Easton, blamed the war on Massachu-
setts’s bad faith in dealing with the Indians.69  Easton, in particular, 
charged that a female tribal chief “‘had practised much [that] the 
quarrell might be desided without war, but sum of our English allso 
in fury against all Indians wold not consent [sic].’”70  Regardless of 
which side actually started the war, it is clear both that a major cause 
of the Indians’ discontent was white encroachment on their lands 
and that the Puritans strove to “exterminate” their tribal opponents.71 
Historian R. David Edmunds recounts eighteenth-century exam-
ples involving tribes defending their lands in the Old Northwest.72  
For example, he describes the tribes’ attempts to maintain their hunt-
ing grounds in what is now Kentucky, along the Licking and Ken-
tucky Rivers.73  During the Revolutionary War, the tribes had formed 
war parties to strike at white settlements along these rivers that were 
interfering with their hunting practices, and Indian villages were 
burned in retaliation.74  However, the tribes’ British allies promised 
them victory after the war.75  Nonetheless, when the British lost the 
war, they made no attempt to protect tribal property rights in the 
 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. (describing the Pequot War of 1637 as the result of English settlers’ moving into an 
area inhabited by the Pequot Indians). 
 67 RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE:  THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE 
AMERICAN FRONTIER 1600–1860, at 79 (1973). 
 68 PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 13. 
 69 See SLOTKIN, supra note 67, at 79–81 (describing how John Easton blamed the war on the 
intolerance of Massachusetts). 
 70 Id. at 80 (alteration in original). 
 71 SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 12. 
 72 See generally EDMUNDS, supra note 40. 
 73 EDMUNDS, supra note 40, at 3. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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Treaty of Paris.76  The frontiersmen then began to advance further in-
to tribal territories in southern Ohio.77  Eventually, after “a series of 
questionable treaties” and “armed expeditions,” in 1794, the Indians 
were forced to give up their claims to most of Ohio.78 
Edmunds describes in detail the 1786 treaty negotiations with the 
Shawnees relating to their claims to Ohio.79  Despite Britain’s assur-
ances to the tribe that the Shawnees maintained ownership over their 
lands after the Revolutionary War, armed U.S. officials told the 
Shawnee treaty delegation that they would have to “give up their 
claims to lands east of the Miami [River] and acknowledge the sove-
reignty of the United States over all their villages.”80  When a Shawnee 
chief replied that the tribe had “no intention of giving up their lands 
in Ohio,” the U.S. Indian agent “threatened the destruction of the 
Shawnee women and children.”81 
B. Later Examples of Tribal Land Loss Often Reflect Tribes’ Inability to 
Make Viable Attempts at Self-Defense 
The historical record is also replete with more modern examples 
of confiscation of tribal lands.  However, in these later cases, tribes 
generally lacked the wherewithal to defend themselves, and therefore 
often did not even attempt to do so.  For instance, between 1820 and 
1850, the vast majority of Indian tribes that occupied lands east of the 
Mississippi were rounded up by the federal government and forced to 
walk west to new lands located in Oklahoma or other western regions, 
thus giving up any remnants of their ancestral land-bases.82  Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s description of the 1831 Choctaw removal illustrates the 
brutality of the process: 
It was then in the depths of winter, and that year the cold was exception-
ally severe . . . . The Indians brought their families with them; there were 
among them the wounded, the sick, newborn babies, and old men on the 
point of death.  They had neither tents nor wagons, but only some provi-
sions and weapons.  I saw them embark across the great river, and the 
sight will never fade from my memory.  Neither sob nor complaint rose 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 4.  This turn of events resulted in demoralization among the Indians as well as 
forced overcrowding as they moved into areas already occupied by other tribes.  Id. 
 79 Id. at 12–13. 
 80 Id. at 13. 
 81 Id. at 13. 
 82 ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 75 (2008). 
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from that silent assembly.  Their afflictions were of long standing, and 
they felt them to be irremediable.83 
Next, during the Reservation Period, from the 1820s through the 
1880s, Indians were forcibly confined to reservations in the hopes of 
converting them to white ways.84  Some tribal members managed to 
escape from the reservations they had been confined to in order to 
attempt to return to their lost homelands.  But in many cases, they 
were doomed because the federal government treated their refusal to 
remain confined (and their attachment to their ancestral lands) as a 
declaration of war.85  For example, in 1879, an imprisoned group of 
Cheyennes who had escaped from their reservation and were at-
tempting to return to their ancestral lands were told that they had to 
return to the reservation.86  When they answered “‘[w]e will die, but 
we will not go back,’” the federal officials attempted to force com-
pliance by keeping the group, including women and children, in the 
barracks without water for three days and without food or fuel for five 
days in temperatures of forty degrees below zero.87  When the group 
finally escaped, the federal troops gunned down as many of the In-
dians as they could.88  Twelve days later, troops found the survivors 
and killed most of them as well, shooting down a total of twenty-four 
Indians, including two babies.89  In this case, the Indians had made an 
abortive attempt at self-defense after they had been encircled by the 
troops, killing two privates and a lieutenant, before they ran out of 
ammunition and were forced to desperately advance with their hunt-
ing knives.90 
 
 83 Id. at 75. 
 84 See, e.g., id. at 77. 
 85 See, e.g., Conners v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 317, 323 (1898). 
 86 Id. at 322. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 322–23. 
 89 Id. at 323.  Another example from this period of federal aggression occurred in 1864, 
when the United States “slaughtered at least 150 Cheyenne and Arapaho who had ga-
thered near Denver to make peace with the United States.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 1.03.  In this case, however, the Tribes sought to 
exercise their right to self-defense by instituting war in response:  “[e]xasperated and 
maddened by this cold-blooded butchery of their women and children, disarmed war-
riors, and old men, the remnant of these Indians sought the aid and protection of the 
Comanches and Kiowas, and obtained both.”  Leighton v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 288, 
326–27 (1894). 
 90 Conners, 33 Ct. Cl. at 323.  Another example of tribal land loss involves the Zuni Tribe.  In 
that case, the federal government took Zuni reservation lands for railroad purposes from 
the late 1880s through the early 1900s, and also allowed white copper miners to appro-
priate Zuni aboriginal copper mines between 1877 and 1882.  Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. Unit-
ed States, 12 Ct. Cl. 641, 657 (1987).  Additionally, between 1901 and 1912, the federal 
government appropriated Zuni lands for third parties under homesteading laws, “failed 
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Finally, the Allotment Period, from the 1880s to the 1920s, pre-
sented another era of massive tribal land loss as a result of the federal 
policy of parceling out reservations to individual tribal members 
(with the intent to make it alienable fee land after a trial period) and 
usually selling off the remainder of each reservation to whites.91  The 
Allotment Policy was driven by white hunger for Indian lands as well 
as by a hope to assimilate Indians into mainstream culture,92 and it 
had the effect of reducing the total tribal land-base from 138 million 
acres to 48 million acres.93 
The above examples demonstrate the extent to which tribes have 
been deprived of their land throughout U.S. history.  They also show 
that many battles between tribes and colonists or Americans were in 
some measure based on the Indians’ attempt to protect their lands 
from white encroachment.  Although tribes initially had the military 
power to make viable attempts to maintain their lands against white 
encroachment, the 1700s, 1800s, and 1900s saw tribes increasingly 
less able to defend themselves or their lands.  In a practical sense, 
then, tribal subjugation by the U.S. government deprived tribes of 
any meaningful right to self-defense by making it impossible for tribes 
to act to defend themselves.  Thus, it is apparent that although tribes 
were perceived as aggressors, in fact they were often defending lands 
that belonged to them and that had been invaded by Europeans or 
confiscated by Americans. 
IV.  THE LABEL OF SAVAGERY WAS AN IMPORTANT AND WIDELY USED 
COMPONENT OF THE PERCEPTION OF INDIANS AS THE AGGRESSORS 
A. The Meaning of “Savage” as Applied to Indians 
Prucha describes two basic and contradictory meanings of “sa-
vage” as applied to Indians by the colonists.94  The first of these is that 
of the “‘noble savage’ [or] natural man living without technology and 
elaborate societal structures.”95  This meaning, although inaccurate 
 
to prevent Anglo, Hispanic, and Navajo trespass onto Zuni lands,” and “allowed third par-
ties to drive the Zunis from their lands and actively prevented the Zunis from controlling 
their land.”  Id. at 658–59. 
 91 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 77. 
 92 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 104. 
 93 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 77; see also Ann E. Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving 
the Supreme Court’s Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 
147, 189–94 (2000) (discussing the Allotment Policy). 
 94 PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 7. 
 95 Id.; see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY:  THE CONSTITUTION, 
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 27 (2002).  This appears to be the meaning that to 
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and offensive for Indians, is not at issue in this Article because it does 
not bear directly on the issue of self-defense.96  The second is the one 
that is relevant here.  It is that of the “‘ignoble savage[]’[:]  treacher-
ous, cruel, perverse, and in many ways approaching the brute beasts 
with whom he shared the wilderness.  In this view, incessant warfare 
and cruelty to captives marked the Indians.”97  In fact, during the co-
lonial period,  “[n]ot a few Englishmen saw the Indians . . . as literally 
children of the Devil.”98 
As the decades wore on, violent clashes with Indians became less 
common due to tribes’ drastically decreased power, and the goal of 
exterminating Indians gave way to one of assimilation.99  Thus, by the 
late 1800s, rather than being seen as children of the Devil, Indians 
were understood as merely biologically inferior to the Anglo-Saxons, 
who were divinely destined to exert a civilizing and bettering influ-
ence not only on Indians and others present in the United States, but 
also on non-Anglo-Saxon peoples throughout the world.100 
Nonetheless, the notion of Indians as warlike savages, which was 
based in large part on the historical myth of the savage war, survived 
and lives on even now in the collective memory and in case law defin-
ing Indians as such and using their alleged savagery to justify depriva-
tions of tribes’ sovereign rights.101  Critical race theorists have ex-
plained how such racialized stereotypes function in the American 
 
which the French colonists who inhabited the Great Lakes Region in the mid- and late-
seventeenth century ascribed.  WHITE, supra note 47, at 58 (describing the “common 
[French colonial] misunderstanding of Algonquian society as a place of license without 
order” and noting that “[i]t was this misperception that gave the word savage its power”). 
 96 However, Keith Aoki has demonstrated that such bifurcated racialized stereotypes readily 
shift in popular imagination from one pole to the other, suggesting that they are in fact 
closely related ways of othering members of non-white racial groups.  Keith Aoki, ‘Foreign-
ness’ & Asian-American Identities:  Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial 
Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 15–16, 35–36, 39 (1996).  Thus, it may be some-
what artificial to attempt to separate out the two stereotypes of savagery. 
 97 PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 7; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 95, at 27. 
 98 PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 7–8. 
 99 See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 95, at 23–28 (noting that reservation policies were eventually 
defended as places where Indians “could be taught ‘arts and industry’ of European civi-
lized life”); see also PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 9 (“[T]he white goal continued to be the ul-
timate transformation of the Indians with whom they came into contact, a ‘civilizing’ 
process that reached its apogee in the United States at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury.”). 
100 See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 95, at 23–28. 
101 See infra note 239; see generally infra Part V (describing how stereotypes operate in the Su-
preme Court’s Indian law cases).  But see PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 8 (arguing that “[a]s 
the English experience deepened, the theoretical concepts of noble and ignoble savagery 
(though long continued in imaginative literature) were replaced by more realistic and 
complex appraisals based on practical encounters”). 
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legal system to deprive people of color of rights.102  In the Indian law 
context, because these cases continue to be cited in contemporary 
decisions that rule against tribal sovereignty, the notion of the Indian 
as a dangerous warlike savage who instigated unwarranted aggres-
sions upon innocent European settlers continues to be implicitly used 
to abrogate tribes’ sovereign rights.  In this sense, tribes continue to 
be punished for past acts of self-defense.  Moreover, abrogations of 
tribal sovereignty literally render tribes unable to defend themselves 
against depredations by outsiders, thus depriving them of the right to 
self-defense in a practical sense. 
The meaning of “savage” as warlike, hostile, or barbarous per-
meates early American case law and other documents.  A brief sam-
pling of these appellations, primarily from pre-twentieth century case 
law, is provided below. 
B. Indians Have Been Widely Defined as "Savage” in Our Early 
Jurisprudence and Related Contexts 
Historical descriptions of tribes (which, in some cases, continued 
into the twentieth century) routinely designated Indians as “savage,” 
“hostile,” or “barbarous.”103  Prior to 1900, these offensive descriptions 
were frequently reified in both state and federal case law.104   Such de-
scriptions were based in large part on the myth that Indians were 
brutal warlike aggressors, when in fact Indians who engaged in con-
flicts with colonies and, later, the United States were often or usually 
acting to defend themselves and their homelands.  These imputations 
of savagery illustrate the othering of Indians based in large part upon 
their acts of self-defense, and such imputations were commonly used 
to help justify abrogating sovereign rights.105 
 
102 See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 96, at 20, 23–24, 32, 37–38; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 16, 
at 1264; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1797 
(1993).   
103 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 28 (March 17, 1865), reprinted in 13 Stat. 753 (1866) (prohibit-
ing sale of arms and ammunition to “hostile Indians”); see also Swetman v. Sanders, 20 
S.W. 124, 125 (1892) (noting that a settler “failed to occupy the land on account of his 
fear of hostile Indians”); Emery, supra note 27, at 475 (describing Indians as “sa-
vage . . . enemies”); Kozuskanich, supra note 27, at 1067 (quoting a 1757 New York Mercury 
article describing Indians as “barbarous enemies”).  
104 See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON:  THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA, at xix (2005) (discussing 
United States Supreme Court cases that relied on racist language in deciding “precedent-
setting cases on Indian rights”). 
105 For a description of the psychological process of othering, see, for example, Jonathan 
Todres, Law, Otherness, and Human Trafficking, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 605, 611–18 
(2009).  As Professor Todres explains, othering occurs, especially in individualist cultures, 
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1. A Sampling of “Savage” Designations in Pre-Twentieth-Century Cases 
In 1801, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained that “[i]n 
1777, the [white] inhabitants fled from the savages.”106  In 1814, the 
Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee described a rural 
district as “remote from the capital, detached from the rest of Virgin-
ia by an extensive wilderness, [and] infested by an Indian enemy”107  
The Tennessee court further described “the harassed and endan-
gered state of this infant settlement, whose very extermination was 
threatened by the savage foe.”108  The Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia in 1827 cited a 1711 Virginia statute that appointed Rangers 
“to restrain disorderly and barbarous Indians frequenting our frontiers” 
and provided that “if any Indian, of any nation at war with us, was 
taken by the Rangers, he should be transported [to the West Indies], 
and sold [as a slave] for the benefit of the Rangers.”109  The Supreme 
Court of Alabama in 1831 quoted the preamble of an 1821 statute 
enacted for one settler’s specific benefit: 
“[W]hereas, the territory now composing the State of Alabama, was dur-
ing our late contest with the British government, subjected to all the 
hardships and cruelties, which a relentless war, waged by the merciless 
savage, is calculated to produce; and whereas, our venerable citizen, Co-
lonel Samuel Dale, was the first to . . . save its defenceless [sic] inhabi-
tants from Indian rapine, and Indian barbarity . . . .”110 
 In an 1835 Tennessee Supreme Court case, the court affirmed its 
jurisdiction over a murder involving a Cherokee victim and a Chero-
kee accused that took place within Cherokee territory, despite con-
trary Supreme Court precedent.111  The majority opinion discussed 
the white settlement of the Carolinas, concluding that: 
[T]he principle by which the country was taken possession of, was the on-
ly rule of action possible to be observed . . . it was more just the country 
should be peopled by Europeans, than continue the haunts of savage 
beasts, and of men yet more fierce and savage, who, “if they might not be 
 
at both the individual and collective levels, and “[a]t both . . . level[s], this Self/Other di-
chotomy functions to create (1) a devalued and dehumanized Other, enabling differen-
tial treatment of the Other; (2) a conception of a virtuous Self and corresponding as-
sumption that the Self (or dominant group) is representative of the norm; and (3) a 
distancing of the Other from the Self.”  Id. at 613–14. 
106 Lessee of Clark v. Hackethorn, 3 Yeates 269, 270 (Pa. 1801). 
107 Smith v. Lessee of Craig, 2 Tenn. 287, 1814 WL 314, at *8 (Tenn. Err. & App. 1814). 
108 Id. 
109 Gregory v. Baugh, 25 Va. 611, 633–34 (1827) (emphasis added). 
110 Dale v. Governor, 3 Stew. 387, 388 (Ala. 1831). 
111 State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 337 (1835).  The U.S. Supreme Court had held three 
years earlier in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 596 (1832), that the State of 
Georgia lacked jurisdiction over Cherokee territory within its state boundaries. 
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extirpated for their want of religion and just morals, they might be rec-
laimed for their errors” . . . . [a] rule of which savages of this description 
have no just right to complain.112 
The court went on to describe the tribes of the “immense west and 
northwest” as “[t]ribes that subsist on raw flesh, and are savage as the 
most savage beasts that infest that mighty wilderness.”113  In somewhat 
less inflammatory, but still racially charged, language, the Court of 
Appeals of Law of South Carolina referred, in 1847, to “frequent wars 
with the savage tribes” and then stated that “[t]he Indians were reck-
less of their own life, and greedy of that of their enemy.”114 
In 1859, the U.S. Supreme Court cited the petition of two settlers 
to establish a ranch in what later became California.115  The 1838 peti-
tion stated that the desired “tract is uncultivated, and in the power of 
a multitude of savage Indians, who have committed and are daily 
committing many depredations; and being satisfied that the tract does not 
belong to any corporation or individuals, they earnestly ask the grant, of-
fering to domesticate the Indians.”116 
In The Sutter Case of 1864,117 the Court described the land Sutter 
attempted to settle beginning in 1839 as “uninhabited, except by 
bands of warlike Indians, who made frequent predatory incursions 
upon the undefended settlements to the south and east of this 
place.”118 
In 1865, the Court of Claims described the Territory of New Mex-
ico during the period between January and August of 1855, stating 
that “[t]here were repeated acts of depredation by the Indians upon 
the property of the white settlers, many acts of cruelty, murder, and 
massacre, such as are incident to savage warfare.”119  An 1866 federal 
appellate case from Oregon referred with reverence to “those who 
had settled and held the country for the United States, amid extreme 
privation and suffering, against the dangerous and savage Indian,”120 
while a Court of Claims case in the same year described the Indian 
population of the upper San Joaquin Valley as “most numerous, most 
warlike, and most hostile.”121 
 
112 Foreman, 16 Tenn. at 265. 
113 Id. at 278. 
114 State v. Belmont, 35 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 445, 451 (S.C. App. L. 1847). 
115 United States v. Teschmaker, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 392, 401 (1859). 
116 Id. (emphasis added).  Note the troubling view that the Indians’ occupation of the tract 
did not demonstrate that they had any ownership interest. 
117 The Sutter Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 562, 587 (1864). 
118 Id. at 563. 
119 Alire v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 233, 238 (1865). 
120 Chapman v. School District, 5 F. Cas. 487, 491 (C.C.D. Or. 1866). 
121 Fremont v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 461, 464 (1866). 
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In 1874, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho described 
“[t]he whole country” as having been “inhabited by wild and barbar-
ous savages.”122  In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that upon 
Wisconsin’s admission to the Union in 1846, “Congress undoubtedly 
expected that at no distant day the State would be settled by white 
people, and the semi-barbarous condition of the Indian tribes would 
give place to the higher civilization of our race.”123  Finally, in 1883, 
the Supreme Court of Nevada noted that “[i]n 1861 the Indians here 
were savages in name and fact,” and that, although “[s]ome were 
peaceable [and] others aggressive and warlike,” they “killed inoffen-
sive white men.”124 
The caricatured history depicted in these cases contrasts sharply 
with the historians’ accounts discussed above in that this case law 
monolithically portrays the tribes, many of whom were presumably 
fighting to retain their lands, as savage aggressors.  While these com-
prise a mere sampling of those pre-1900 cases that describe Indians as 
savages or use other designations of the same import, they provide a 
general idea of the extent to which Indians were viewed through the 
prism of violent, irrational otherness and even demonized.125  Given 
that Indians were being described as such in significant part as a re-
sult of their attempts to defend themselves and their homelands and 
their resistance to European encroachment, this judicial othering of 
 
122 Pickett v. United States, 1 Idaho 523, 530 (1874). 
123 Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 526 (1877). 
124 State ex rel. Truman v. McKenney, 2 Nev. 171, 179 (1883). 
125 It is important to understand that this view of tribes, although extremely prevalent, was 
probably not universal.  For example, in 1826, the Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals 
of Tennessee surprisingly concluded that: 
[T]he early notions of the Spaniards and others, “that the Indians were mere savage 
beasts without rights of any kind,” have long since been exploded, as the result of ava-
rice, fraud, and rapacity; and that those who acted upon them, are at this day 
deemed by the people of the United States, more savage and cruel than those they 
despoiled.  The Cherokees are, in point of fact, a conquered people, with ac-
knowledged rights; which rights, I am proud to say, have for the last thirty years, 
been respected with that good faith on our part, that became us as honest men 
and christians, and which the courts of justice are bound to regard. 
  Cornet v. Winton’s Lessee, 10 Tenn. 143, 150 (1826) (citation omitted).  Given that the 
author of this opinion was Judge Catron, the same judge who wrote the opinion in Fore-
man, which was decided a few years later, and that he later became a Supreme Court Jus-
tice and authored a concurring opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 
(1856), in which he argued that Dred Scott was lawful property the title to which Con-
gress could not annul, this language should not be over-emphasized.  See Dred Scott, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) at 527–29 (Catron, J., concurring); see supra notes 112–13 and accompany-
ing text (quoting and citing Foreman).  It is difficult to know what to make of the discre-
pancies among the language used here, that used in Foreman, and that used in Justice Ca-
tron’s opinion in Dred Scott. 
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Indians as savage and the concomitant abrogations of tribal rights to 
be discussed later serve to punish tribes for past acts of self-defense. 
2. Contemporary References to Indians as Savages 
Judicial references to Indians as savages have become less com-
mon, although they still occur in published opinions, usually in quo-
tations of earlier cases or documents.  Three recent examples are dis-
cussed below.  In April 2009, a federal bankruptcy court in Texas 
quoted language from an 1857 Texas Supreme Court case, which the 
bankruptcy court appreciatively described as “colorful[]”: 
It has been comparatively but a few years since the first settlements of 
Americans were made in Texas.  The whole country was then infested by 
savages.  Subsequently there were hostilities with Mexicans, and the fron-
tiers are still exposed to the incursions of Indians.  The country has been 
settled, and still is settling, by, in a great measure, force of arms.126 
In Warren v. United States, decided in 2000, the District of Columbia 
Circuit held plaintiff’s quiet title action to be barred by the statute of 
limitations.127  In so holding, the court quoted a 1947 Supreme Court 
case that distinguished the quiet title action at issue there from those 
involving “‘savage tribe[s]’” and “‘hitherto unknown islet[s].’”128  Fi-
nally, in 1987, the Court of Claims noted that in the 1500s, the Span-
ish had recognized the Zuni Tribe’s territory “as a foreign nation and 
not as an area occupied by a savage tribe.”129 
These references, with the exception of the first from In re Wilson, 
are generally less virulent than the earlier references to tribes as sa-
vages.  However, they nonetheless demonstrate that it is still accepta-
ble and even legally sanctioned to refer to tribes as “savages,” at least 
by quoting earlier cases and other documents.130  These cases also 
demonstrate that when modern courts quote earlier sources that use 
this type of language, the language is not considered so abhorrent 
that modern courts feel the need to explicitly disclaim it or to careful-
ly examine the rationale of the cases cited for elements of racism.131  
 
126 In re Wilkinson, 402 B.R. 756, 765 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (quoting Choate v. Redding, 18 Tex. 
579, 580–81 (1857)). 
127 Warren v. United States, 234 F.3d 1331, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
128 Id. at 1338 (quoting United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 268 (1947)). 
129 Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607, 618 (1987). 
130 See WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 57 (explaining that modern Indian law cases rely on ear-
lier explicitly racist cases “frequently and without any form of discomfort, embarrassment, 
or even qualification”). 
131 This blindness is most likely due to the basic cultural problem “that much hate speech is 
not perceived as such at the time” because it accords with “messages, scripts, and stereotypes 
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Thus, referring to tribes and Indians as “savages” appears to remain 
at least somewhat socially acceptable, even in the staid arena of the 
judiciary.  This situation for tribes and Indians, in which racial epi-
thets are still used in judicial opinions without being recognized as 
such, differs markedly from that for African Americans in that courts 
tend to not only not rely on virulently racist decisions pertaining to 
them, such as Dred Scott,132 but also explicitly disclaim such decisions.133  
Furthermore, unlike the situation for tribes and Indians, racial epi-
thets used to demean African Americans tend to be recognized as 
such and thus may be avoided by courts, even in quotations.134  By 
contrast, courts’ continued repetition of language denigrating tribes 
as “savage,” without any express disapproval of the earlier language, 
signals to the rest of society that it is both legal and reasonable “to act 
in a racially discriminatory and hostile way” towards tribes and In-
dians.135  Additionally, as argued below, such repetition and reliance 
on offensive opinions enable further derogation of tribal rights.136 
Moreover, because the language of savagery is tied to and stems in 
significant part from many tribes’ defense of their homelands (in 
other words, from their exercise of the right of self-defense) the repe-
tition of the language and the abrogations of tribal sovereignty that 
are based on it constitute a punishment for tribes’ historical exercise 
of their right to self-defense.  Furthermore, tribes’ sharply circum-
 
that are embedded . . . in the national psyche.”  DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 40, at 
28. 
132 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
133 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 18 (“Supreme Court justices [sic] never cite [Dred 
Scott] . . . except as a prime example of a very bad precedent.”). 
134 See, e.g., Jones v. First Student, Inc., No. 07-C-7139, 2009 WL 2949720, at *3 & n.3 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (noting, in an employment discrimination case, that the word “nigger,” 
which was alleged to have been used by the plaintiffs’ co-worker, would be replaced 
throughout the opinion by “N-word”); see also EEOC v. Bimbo Bakeries U.S.A., Inc., No. 
1:09-CV-1872, 2010 WL 598641, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2010) (“While simple teasing, off-
hand comments, and isolated incidents usually do not amount to discriminatory changes 
in the terms and conditions of employment, the use of racial epithets—especially the 
word ‘nigger,’ which has a long and sordid history in this country—can quickly change 
the atmosphere, environment, and culture of a workplace from positive to poisonous.”); 
Jones, 2009 WL 2949720, at *5 (quoting another court’s statement that the “N-word is an 
‘unambiguously racial epithet’”) (internal citation omitted). 
135 WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 21. 
136 Cf. Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property:  Guestworkers, International Trade, and the Democracy 
Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27, 41 (2006) (discussing the fact that popular portrayal 
of undocumented immigrants as “animals” makes it “easier for Americans to see both le-
gal and illegal immigrants as lacking any rights” and arguing that “framing guestworkers 
as goods to be imported” similarly “leads to a conception of guestworkers as lacking any 
agency in the terms and conditions of their employment”). 
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scribed sovereignty under federal law literally renders them unable to 
defend against non-Indian depredations. 
3. Five Supreme Court Cases That Use the “Savagery” Designation Form 
Part of the Canon of Indian Law and Continue to Be Widely Cited 
In addition to the overt contemporary use of the term “savage” 
discussed above, four Supreme Court cases from the 1800s and one 
from the 1950s that use designations of ignoble savagery form part of 
the canon of Indian law and continue to be cited by the Supreme 
Court and other courts.137  While the continuing effect of these cases 
will be addressed in detail in Part V, it is useful here to understand 
the racist language that the Court used in these cases. 
In the earliest case, Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall 
stated that: 
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose 
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the 
forest.  To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the 
country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, 
because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and 
were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.138 
While this description is less one-dimensionally racialized than many 
of the others cited above, it still contains extremely harmful racialized 
elements.  For one, “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country” are 
defined monolithically, despite the fact that tribes are in fact cultural-
ly diverse.  More importantly for the purposes of this Article, they are 
all classed “as fierce savages whose occupation was war.”  Finally, the 
Court states that “[t]o leave them in possession of their country was 
to leave the country a wilderness.”  While the statement contains an 
implicit and somewhat rare acknowledgement that the country did in 
fact belong to tribes, it is followed by the all-too-familiar claim that 
the Indians somehow did not deserve to retain their lands, apparently 
because of their differing conception of property rights.  Coupled 
with the description of Indians as “fierce savages, whose occupation 
was war,” this statement supports Justice Marshall’s conclusions that 
the colonial government’s attempt to dispossess and conquer them 
was inevitable and that the United States had a legal right to their 
 
137 See generally Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 
109 U.S. 556 (1883); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S.(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); 
see also WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 51–58, 60–70, 75–79, 89–95 (discussing these five cas-
es and their use of the language of savagery). 
138 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590. 
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land under the doctrine of discovery.139  Thus, this passage operates as 
a justification for the course of colonial and early American history, 
much along the lines of Richard Slotkin’s discussion of the myth of 
the savage war.140 
In Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the next case, Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, he rejects the argument that the Cherokee Nation can 
be considered a foreign nation under the Constitution for purposes 
of invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction in a suit against Georgia, 
which was then committing numerous depredations against the Na-
tion and its people.141  Part of the Chief Justice’s reasoning for reject-
ing the Cherokee’s argument is that “the habits and usages of the In-
dians” at the time the Constitution was written did not lend 
themselves to the institution of legal actions; rather, “[t]heir appeal 
was to the tomahawk, or to the government.”142  So, once again, we 
see the Court espouse a view of a tribe as irrational and warlike, and 
once again, this view is used to justify denying the tribe the legal 
rights to which others (here, other nations) are considered automati-
cally entitled.  Moreover, the Court’s decision literally had the effect 
of leaving the Nation defenseless against Georgia’s attempts “to anni-
hilate the Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of 
Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by 
the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in 
force.”143 
 
139 The doctrine of discovery granted European nations rights to tribally occupied land in 
the New World by virtue of “discovering” it.  See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 51–53 
(alteration in original); see also Tweedy, supra note 57, at 665–67 (2009) (explaining the 
doctrine of discovery as formulated in Johnson v. M’Intosh).  In addition to the deprivation 
of tribal property rights that it effected, the doctrine of discovery also justified infringe-
ment on other aspects of tribal sovereignty.  See, e.g., Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Dis-
covery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (explaining that Indian “na-
tional sovereignty and independence were considered to have been limited by Discovery 
since it restricted the Indian nations’ international diplomacy, commercial, and political 
activities to only their ‘discovering’ European country”). 
140 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting from SLOTKIN, su-
pra note 2). 
141 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 7–8, 12–13, 15, 20 (“[A]n Indian tribe or nation 
within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution, and cannot 
maintain an action in the courts of the United States.”); see also Gloria Valencia-Weber, 
The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions:  Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the 
Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 454 (2003) (detailing violent 
actions undertaken by the citizens of Georgia against Indians in the late 1700s). 
142 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18. 
143 Id. at 15.  In a 2009 petition for certiorari, a tribal member asked the Court to overturn 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia’s determination that tribes are not foreign nations on the basis 
that it was unconstitutional and in violation of the United States’ human rights treaty ob-
ligations, and he further suggested that the decision was comparable to Plessy v. Ferguson, 
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Next, in Worcester v. Georgia, a case that actually affirms tribal sove-
reignty vis-à-vis the claims of the State of Georgia, the Court makes 
multiple references to the tribes as warlike.144  For instance, it de-
scribes the tribes’ “general employment” as “war, hunting, and fish-
ing.”145  Later, the Court describes tribes as “[f]ierce and warlike in 
their character.”146  Finally, and perhaps most offensively, the Court 
quotes from, and relies upon, virulently anti-Indian colonial charters 
in reaching its decision that the State of Georgia lacks the authority 
to unilaterally declare war on the Cherokees under the circumstances 
of the case.147  For example, it quotes the following language from the 
charter to William Penn:  “in so remote a country, near so many bar-
barous nations, the incursions, as well of the savages themselves, as of 
other enemies . . . may probably be feared.”148  It similarly quotes the 
charter to Georgia as follows: 
[W]hereas our provinces in North America have been frequently ravaged 
by Indian enemies, more especially that of South Carolina, which, in the 
late war by the neighbouring savages, was laid waste by fire and sword, 
and great numbers of the English inhabitants miserably massacred; and 
our loving subjects, who now inhabit there . . . will, in case of any new 
war, be exposed to the like calamities, inasmuch as their whole southern 
frontier continueth unsettled, and lieth open to the said savages.149 
The references to the warring character of the tribes give credence to 
a racialized, caricatured view of them as irrational instigators of war.  
This view is amplified by the damning anti-Indian judgments con-
tained in the colonial charters.  While the charters undoubtedly con-
stituted good evidence of the reach of Georgia’s and other states’ 
powers over tribes under English law, to quote them without even ac-
knowledging the one-sided views they encompassed perpetuated the 
 
163 U.S. 537, 552–53 (1896), upholding the “separate but equal” doctrine of racial segre-
gation.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, Smith v. Shulman, No. 09-512 (Oct. 28, 
2009), available at http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2009/11/01/shinnecock-member-
asks-supreme-court-to-overturn-cherokee-nation-v-georgia/, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 809 
(2009).  In the extremely unlikely event the Court were to decide to overrule Cherokee Na-
tion on this issue at some point, the overruling would presumably have the effect of rees-
tablishing tribes’ collective right to self-defense as nations under international law.  See 
supra Part I.A, (describing the collective right to self-defense under international law).  
But given the complicated and enmeshed relationship between federally recognized tri-
bes and the federal government that has developed since Cherokee Nation, it is now very 
difficult to imagine the Court holding tribes to be foreign nations. 
144 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
145 Id. at 543; WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 64 (citing Worcester and discussing quoted lan-
guage). 
146 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 546. 
147 WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 67–68. 
148 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 545. 
149 Id. at 546. 
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stereotypes of Indians and the view that they in fact committed the 
atrocities of which they are accused. 
The fourth case, Ex Parte Crow Dog, was decided in 1883.150  In it, 
the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over an on-
reservation murder of one Indian by another that had already been 
resolved according to tribal tradition because Congress had not ex-
pressly provided for federal jurisdiction.  While this case is considered 
by many to be a victory for tribal rights, albeit a short-lived one, it is a 
victory that relies on a racalized premise and, in that sense, it is a very 
dangerous victory.151  The Court explains that the Sioux, pursuant to a 
treaty and associated act of Congress: 
[W]ere . . . to be subject to the laws of the United States, not in the sense 
of citizens, but, as they had always been, as wards subject to a guardian; 
not as individuals, constituted members of the political community of the 
United States, with a voice in the selection of representatives and the 
framing of the laws, but as a dependent community who were in a state of 
pupilage, advancing from the condition of a savage tribe to that of a 
people who, through the discipline of labor, and by education, it was 
hoped might become a self-supporting and self-governed society.152 
Thus, in addition to relying on racialized ward-guardianship language 
and describing tribes as in a “state of pupilage”—ideas that both de-
rive from the Marshall Trilogy153—the Court uses the Sioux’s alleged 
savagism to justify their lack of political rights. 
Later in the opinion, the Court goes even further: 
It is a case where . . . that law . . . is sought to be extended over aliens and 
strangers; over the members of a community, separated by race, by tradi-
tion, by the instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and 
power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and 
unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil con-
duct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have no pre-
vious warning; which judges them by a standard made by others, and not 
for them, which takes no account of the conditions which should except 
them from its exactions, and makes no allowance for their inability to 
understand it.  It tries them not by their peers, nor by the customs of 
their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different 
race, according to the law of a social state of which they have an imper-
fect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to the 
habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which 
measures the red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.154 
 
150 Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
151 WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 77–79. 
152 109 U.S. at 568–69. 
153 WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 76–77; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 
1, 17 (1831). 
154 109 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added). 
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Here again, the quote is saturated with racialized constructs.  The 
reference to the Sioux’s “free though savage life” suggests that they 
are lawless and therefore inferior when in fact their laws were simply 
different than those of the dominant colonial society.155  It describes 
the law under which the Sioux defendant was charged as “opposed to 
the strongest prejudices of [the Sioux’s] savage nature,” again sug-
gesting that the rule of law itself is foreign to the tribe’s irrational sa-
vagism.  Finally, the passage makes a binary distinction between “the 
red man’s revenge,” again incorporating the idea of Indians as irra-
tional and vengeful, with the rational and civilized “maxims of the 
white man’s morality.”156  The references to the “strongest prejudices” 
of the Sioux’s “savage nature” and to the “red man’s revenge” are 
ironic, however, because there was nothing vengeful or savage about 
the traditional resolution of the murder that the tribe had already ef-
fected; rather, in an effort to “preserve the community cooperation 
necessary for the Sioux way of life,” peacekeepers were ordered to 
meet with both sides, after which the murderer’s family made an of-
fering to the victim’s family of money, horses, and a blanket.157  Thus, 
the real problem from the perspective of the federal government ap-
pears to have been that the tribal solution was not savage enough. 
The final Supreme Court case that explicitly incorporates lan-
guage of ignoble savagery and continues to be widely cited is the 1955 
case, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.158  This case builds on the 
doctrine of discovery, as formulated in Johnson, to hold that tribes are 
not entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment when 
lands to which they have aboriginal title are confiscated by the United 
States government.159  The Court uses the language of savagery to 
help bolster its conclusion that the Tee-Hit-Ton Tribe was not en-
titled to Fifth Amendment compensation due to the fact that tribes 
generally have lost their lands to the United States through conquest 
rather than through arms-length transactions: 
 
155 See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology:  Native American Genetic Re-
sources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 396, 397–98 (2007) (de-
scribing traditional tribal notions of property rights). 
156 109 U.S. at 571; see WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 78–79 (describing this passage from Ex 
Parte Crow Dog). 
157 ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 91; see also Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and 
the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 770 & n.303 (2006) (alluding to the traditional tribal reso-
lution that had already taken place in Ex Parte Crow Dog). 
158 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
159 WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 89–94 (discussing the holding and background of Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians and connecting it with the Johnson case). 
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Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent 
were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the 
Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and 
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of 
their land.160 
Here we see the adjective “savage” working to implicitly dehumanize 
the tribes and lessen or obliterate any possible sympathy that the 
reader might feel for them as a result of the uncompensated confisca-
tion of their land.161  In effect, we as non-Indian readers are told that 
the tribes are just savages, so we need not worry about what happens 
to them. 
As discussed below, this racialized imagery of Indians has had and 
continues to have devastating effects for tribes in terms of their legal 
rights162 and the violence they face and have faced with impunity.  
Robert Williams has explained that in incorporating racist constructs 
such as savagery into landmark decisions, the Supreme Court “gives 
racism an authoritative, binding legal meaning in our legal system” 
and that “[t]he perceived inferiority of that group has been given the 
sanction of law in the legal history of racism in America.”163  I would 
argue that, although the Supreme Court may be the most important 
vessel of this power, all American courts possess it to some degree.  
Thus, based on the numerous cases quoted above, it is clear that ra-
cialized views of Indians, particularly those caricaturing them as vio-
lent, irrational, and warlike (i.e., ignoble savages) are an important 
constituent of American history164 and continue in force today.  As 
shown below, these caricatured images have facilitated both vigilante 
 
160 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 289–90.  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians to some degree bucks the 
trend of describing tribes as aggressors in that it seems to admit that the United States 
and the colonies instigated conflicts in attempts to confiscate tribal lands. 
161 Cf. Garcia, supra note 136, at 41 (explaining how descriptions of groups such as immi-
grants and guestworkers as inhuman can lead to a popular conception that such groups 
lack rights); accord Johnson, supra note 102, at 1747 (describing how the racialized testi-
mony of a white witness to the effect that the black victim was bear-like and “subhuman” 
in the trial of police officers for the beating of Rodney King allowed the jurors to disre-
gard the victim’s suffering and the wrongs inflicted upon him). 
162 See WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at xxv (“The racist precedents and language of Indian sava-
gery . . . have most often worked . . . to justify the denial to Indians of important rights of 
property, self-government, and cultural survival.”). 
163 Id. at 17. 
164 E.g., id. at 39 (“Indianophobia, as generated by the language of Indian savagery in Ameri-
can history, is an important part of who we are as a people in America.  It’s one of the 
original, founding forms of racism and racial hostility cultivated by Europeans in the New 
World, and it constitutes a primal driving force in defining how we became who we are as 
a people today.”). 
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and state-sanctioned violence against Indians.165  The images also mo-
tivated the federal, state, and colonial governments to explicitly deny 
Indians the right to self-defense, including the narrower right to bear 
arms.  Additionally, as discussed in Part V.A, these images are used to 
implicitly justify abrogations of tribal sovereignty in case law. 
D. Unpunished Acts of Vigilantism Against Indians and Legally Sanctioned 
Violence Against Them 
Historical vigilante and state-sanctioned violence against Indians is 
discussed below, followed by the denial of Indians’ rights to self-
defense, including the right to bear arms.  Both patterns—that of vi-
olence against Indians and that of explicitly denying Indians the right 
to self-defense—are necessarily tied to the American view of Indians 
as violent savages who need to be preemptively attacked and dis-
armed to protect white safety.166 
1. Vigilante Violence at Work:  The Paxton Riots of 1763 and 1764 
As might be expected, the stereotypes and the perceived other-
ness of Indians that they embody enabled the colonists and early 
Americans to engage in brutal, unpunished acts of violence against 
individual Indians and tribes.  Indeed, such vigilante attacks were 
common in early American history.167  One particularly important in-
 
165 Accord Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 16, at 1264 (noting that the stereotype during the 
Reconstruction Period of African American men as “brutish and bestial . . . was offered to 
justify the widespread lynching that took 2,500 black lives between 1885 and 1900”). 
166 See, e.g., id. 
167 See, e.g., EDMUNDS, supra note 40, at 4–5 (“Although white poachers [in the 1790s] killed 
deer on Indian lands with impunity, tribesmen trespassing on white property were consi-
dered fair game for frontier marksmen.  Many Indians on peaceful trading ventures with-
in the settlements were robbed and murdered by American citizens, but frontier courts 
systematically acquitted culprits accused of such crimes. . . . Governor William Henry 
Harrison of Indiana Territory confessed that ‘a great many of the Inhabitants of the Fron-
teers [sic] consider the murdering of Indians in the highest degree meritorious.’” (altera-
tion in original) (citations omitted)); id. at 22 (“[In 1800,] Governor St. Clair pointed out 
that the Shawnees and their Indian neighbors daily were subjected to ‘injustice and 
wrongs of the most provoking character, for which I have never heard that any person 
was ever brought to justice and punishment . . . .’”); see also Valencia-Weber, supra note 
141, at 454 (quoting President Washington’s 1795 statement that “‘the fair prospect [of 
amicable relations with the Cherokees and Creeks as a result of successful treaty negotia-
tions] in this quarter has been once more clouded by wanton murders, which some citi-
zens of Georgia are represented to have recently perpetrated on hunting parties of the 
Creeks, which have again subjected that frontier to disquietude and danger’”).  See gener-
ally Keith Thor Carlson, The Lynching of Louie Sam, 109 B.C. STUD. 63, 63 (1996) (describ-
ing the unpunished lynching of a fifteen-year-old Indian boy from British Columbia in 
1884 by Washington settlers who framed him for murder, and noting that “[w]ithin 
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stance of such vigilante violence was the Paxton Riots, which are cre-
dited with having significantly shaped the individual rights concep-
tion of the Second Amendment that Heller embodies.168  In Pennsyl-
vania in December 1763, “a group of mostly Scot[s]-Irish Presbyterian 
frontiersmen slaughtered twenty Indians . . . claiming that [they] had 
perpetrated murders along the frontier.”169  In early 1764, these same 
frontiersmen marched to Philadelphia “intent on killing the Mora-
vian Indians moved there by the government for protection.”170  In an 
effort to gain more public support for their actions, the rioters later 
voluntarily issued what apparently passed for an apology.171  It in-
cluded six sworn testimonies of “dubious veracity” asserting that the 
slaughtered Indians had been guilty of murder and asked the rhetor-
ical question of whether “‘any person [can] be so little acquainted 
with the law of nature, . . . as to suppose that the [Indians’] giving up 
this single article [of their independent nationhood] to us would se-
cure to every individual of them the benefit of a trial by our laws.’”172  
This rhetorical question indicates the disdain in which at least some 
settlers held Indians, and it shows that some such people believed 
that Indians were fair game for murder with impunity. 
Despite the protestations of the Quakers, “no trial was ever held,” 
and these men were never brought to justice.173  Instead, their actions 
are credited with having helped “shape[] popular ideas of defense 
and the essential role government played in providing safety.”174 
 
American society, vigilante violence had long been viewed as a legitimate means of estab-
lishing (or re-establishing) social order”).  Recently, the Washington State Legislature 
passed a resolution acknowledging the lynching and apologizing for not taking action 
against the lynchers.  H.R. Res. 4715, 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2005-06/Pdf/Bills/House%20Resolutions/
4715-Sto%20lo%20Nation.pdf; S. Res. 8729, 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2005-
06/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Resolutions/8729-Sto-lo%20Nation.pdf; see also Richard Slotkin, 
Equalizers:  The Cult of the Colt in American Culture, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA 54, 62 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003) (stating that “[v]igilantism is the extra-
legal use of deadly force by an organization of private individuals to achieve some public 
or political goal” and that “[v]igilante or ‘Regulator’ movements figured periodically in 
the development of frontier settlements before 1850, . . . [b]ut after 1865, vigilance or-
ganizations became the cutting edge of social conflict”). 
168 See Kozuskanich, supra note 27, at 1042, 1044, 1052–53 (describing how the historical ori-
gins of the Second Amendment were impacted by the legal complaints that motivated the 
Paxton Riots). 
169 Id. at 1051. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1052. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1053. 
174 Id. at 1054. 
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This instance of vigilantism and the rioters’ success in influencing 
their fellow colonists and the colonial government, which eventually 
adopted the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776 partly in re-
sponse to the Paxton Riots,175 are particularly significant for purposes 
of understanding the vision of the Second Amendment espoused by 
the Supreme Court in Heller.  This is because “[i]ndividual rights 
scholars have consistently claimed the Pennsylvania Declaration of 
Rights as their own, insisting that it provides evidence that Americans 
understood the right to bear arms as one of personal self-defense.”176  
Moreover, “the language of Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights of 
1776” is “[a]t the center” of the D.C. Circuit’s “historical interpreta-
tion of the Second Amendment” that the Supreme Court affirmed in 
Heller.177  More importantly, the Heller majority itself significantly re-
lied on the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights in construing the 
Second Amendment to include an individual right to bear arms.178  
This history shows that the Second Amendment as presently consti-
tuted stems from an idea of Indians as savage enemies who lacked 
rights of their own and against whom colonists needed to defend.  In 
other words, the amendment is historically predicated on destructive, 
racialized views of Indians. 
2. Legally Sanctioned Violence Against Indians 
In addition to vigilantism, there were also many instances of de 
jure violence against Indians, which were implicitly justified by the 
notion of tribes as savages.  One particularly stark example is the fact 
that many colonies had laws providing for the payment of bounty for 
delivery of Indian scalps.179 
Additionally, the State of Georgia hanged a Cherokee man in 
1830 in open defiance of a writ of error from the U.S. Supreme 
Court.180  Prior to the hanging, a conference of Georgia judges had 
 
175 Id. at 1060–62. 
176 Id. at 1044. 
177 Id. at 1041–42 (discussing Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 
aff’d District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)). 
178 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2802 (2008). 
179 See, e.g., David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself?  
Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 173, 182 
n.43 (2004) (noting that “most colonies paid bounties for Indian scalps, which often just 
led to the murder of Christianized, neutral, peaceful Indians”); see also Proclamation of 
Jonathan Belcher, Governor of the Province of New Jersey (June 2, 1756) (providing for 
payment of $130 for delivery of an adult male Indian scalp). 
180 ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 53–54; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 
12–13 (1831). 
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rejected the Cherokee Nation’s legal argument that the State lacked 
jurisdiction because the crime occurred in federally recognized Che-
rokee territory, concluding that the “‘habits, manners, and imbecile 
intellect’ of the Indians opposed their governance as an independent 
state.”181  When the Supreme Court finally determined in a later case, 
Worcester v. Georgia,182 that the State of Georgia lacked jurisdiction over 
Cherokee territory, the Georgia Guard retaliated against the celebrat-
ing Cherokees by throwing three of them in jail and promising that if 
the United States attempted to come to their aid, the Cherokees 
“would be swept of the Earth before any assistance could arrive.”183 
Moreover, colonies such as Virginia had laws that prescribed brut-
al punishments for Indians and African Americans.  For instance, a 
1723 Virginia law provided that “Negros, Mullattos, or Indians,” could 
testify against “Negros, or other slaves” accused of conspiring to rebel 
or make insurrection, but that 
where any such Negro, Mullatto, or Indian, shall, upon due Proof 
made . . . be found to have given a false Testimony, every such Offender 
shall, without further Trial, be ordered by the said Court to have one Ear 
nailed to the Pillory, and there to stand for the Space of one Hour, and 
then the said Ear to be cut off; and thereafter, the other Ear nailed in 
like Manner, and cut off, at the Expiration of one other Hour; and 
moreover, to order every such Offender Thirty-Nine Lashes, well laid on, 
on his or her bare Back, at the common Whipping-Post.184 
Additionally, “[d]uring the Seven Years’ War, it became official policy 
to kill Indian prisoners, whom in time many officers simply called 
‘those Vermine.’”185 
Finally, the federal government itself was responsible for many 
atrocities.  For example, as discussed previously, in 1879, the govern-
ment apprehended a group of Cheyennes who had escaped from the 
reservation to which the federal government had forcibly removed 
them.  When the Indians refused to return, 
The military authorities . . . resorted to the means for subduing the 
Cheyennes by which a former generation of animal tamers subdued wild 
beasts.  In the midst of the dreadful winter, with the thermometer 40 be-
 
181 ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 53. 
182 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
183 ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 74 (quoting Letter from William Williamson, Subcommander 
of the Georgia Guard, to Wilson Lumpkin, Governor of Georgia (Apr. 28, 1832) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), available at http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/tei-
natamer-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=tcc537).  
184 A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, NOW IN FORCE, IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA 
339–341 (1733) [hereinafter A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS]. 
185 SILVER, supra note 34, at 132; see also id. at 91 (describing a 1757 essay by Colonel James 
Burd of Pennsylvania in which he “urg[ed] attacks on Indian villages”). 
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low zero, the Indians, including the women and children, were kept for 
five days and nights without food or fuel, and for three days without wa-
ter.  At the end of that time they broke out of the barracks in which they 
were confined and rushed forth into the night.  The troops pursued, fir-
ing upon them as upon enemies in war . . . .186 
Another example of such a federally sanctioned atrocity had oc-
curred fifteen years earlier in 1864, when the United States “slaugh-
tered at least 150 Cheyenne and Arapaho who had gathered near 
Denver to make peace with the United States.”187 
As these few examples demonstrate, Indians were not at all safe in 
colonial and early America, and, as shown above, the atrocities com-
mitted against them were implicitly or explicitly justified by the popu-
lar perception of Indians as savages who uniformly instigated attacks 
on innocent whites.188 
E. Indians Were Historically Denied the Right to Self-Defense 
In addition to being subjected to countless acts of violence, In-
dians were also historically denied the right to carry arms and, in 
some cases, were explicitly denied the right to defend themselves.  
Both types of laws appear to have been attempts to achieve the same 
result, namely, to protect whites from Indians’ perceived violent or 
savage tendencies, perceptions that stem largely from tribes’ justified 
acts of self-defense.  Moreover, these laws constitute clear-cut denials 
of Indians’ rights to self-defense. 
1. Historical Prohibitions on Indians’ Right to Defend Themselves 
a. In 1705, Virginia Forbade Indians and Blacks from Raising 
a Hand in Opposition to a Christian 
Virginia’s draconian law provided for no qualifications or excep-
tions: 
[I]f any Negro, Mulatto, or Indian, Bond or Free, shall at any Time lift his 
or her Hand in Opposition against any Christian, not being Negro, Mu-
latto, or Indian, he or she so offending, shall, for every such Offence, 
proved by the Oath of the Party, receive on his or her bare Back, Thirty 
 
186 Conners v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 317, 322–23 (1898). 
187 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 1.03[7]. 
188 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 53 (quoting Georgian judges’ determination of In-
dians to be unsuited to govern themselves because of their “habits, manners, and imbe-
cile intellect”). 
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Lashes, well laid on; cognizable by a Justice of the Peace for that County 
wherein such Offence shall be committed.189 
Thus, under this law, Indians, as well as blacks, were literally denied 
any right to defend themselves, at least when the aggressor was a 
white Christian.  Moreover, it appears from the wording that all that 
was needed to prove the violation of this law was for the alleged vic-
tim to claim under oath that a violation had occurred.  It is difficult 
to imagine more powerful evidence of subjugation than this wholly 
one-sided law.  The law also suggests an understanding of Indians 
(and blacks) as dangerous aggressors who must be subject to harsh 
penalties for the least transgression to prevent the chaos that would 
otherwise ensue as a result of their irrational violent tendencies. 
b. In the 1850s, the United States Forbade the Zuni Tribe 
from Defending Against Raids and Harassment from Other 
Tribes 
In 1848 and 1850, the United States promised “to protect the Zu-
nis from raiding Navajos, while the Zunis themselves were prohibited 
from pursuing military campaigns against the Navajos without the 
consent of the territorial authorities of Santa Fe.”190  Nonetheless, 
when the “Navajos continued raiding and harassing” the Zunis, the 
United States not only forbade them “from taking any action to de-
fend themselves,” but also “failed to provide [the] adequate protec-
tion” it had promised to the Zunis.191  Thus, we see again the view of 
Indians as untrustworthy, presumably because of their violent (in 
other words, “savage”) tendencies, being used to deny tribes the right 
to self-defense even when the circumstances clearly indicate the need 
for self-defense.  Also apparent from this example is federal apathy 
towards the plight of the Zunis, which may well stem from the per-
ception of Indians in general as savage or uncivilized.  As will be 
shown below, such apathy continues today. 
2. Prohibitions on Indians’ Bearing Arms and on Trading Arms and 
Ammunition to Indians 
Indians were historically forbidden from bearing arms under co-
lonial, state, and federal law prohibitions, which constituted historical 
denials of Indians’ (and tribes’) right to self-defense.  Additionally, 
 
189 A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS, supra note 184, at 226. 
190 Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 641, 646–47 (1987). 
191 Id. at 647, 655. 
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gun-rights advocate Don Kates has argued that the original intent of 
the Second Amendment itself was to exclude Indians and blacks.192  
This interpretation comports with common sense, given that the 
need for self-defense in the colonies and, specifically, the need for 
militias, was originally grounded on the perceived need to defend 
against Indian aggression.193 
a. Federal Prohibitions 
i. The Uniform Militia Act Suggests That the Second 
Amendment Was Intended to Exclude Indians 
The first federal law enacted under the Second Amendment was 
the Uniform Militia Act, which required white male citizens between 
eighteen and forty-five to enroll in the militia.194  It was enacted one 
year after the Second Amendment was ratified and, therefore, pro-
vides good evidence of the original intent of the Amendment.195  On 
its face, the Act excludes everyone but white men, at least from feder-
al service.196  Because the Uniform Militia Act bears on the intent be-
hind the Second Amendment, its exclusion of everyone but white 
men from federal militia service suggests that the “people” referred 
to in the Amendment was originally meant to denote a group whose 
membership was subject to race (and sex) restrictions.197  From this 
 
192 Kates, supra note 9, at 217 n.54. 
193 See supra Part II.A. 
194 See Uniform Militia Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed 1903). 
195 See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 9, at 1373 n.47; cf. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2810 (stating that 
“discussions [that] took place 75 years after the ratification of the Second Amend-
ment . . . do not provide as much insight into its original meaning as earlier sources”); 
Kates, supra note 9, at 266 (averring that “one can scarcely argue that the First Militia Act 
violated the [Second] amendment”). 
196 See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 9, at 1373 n.47; Williams, supra note 1, at 451; see also Ulliver & 
Merkel, supra note 7, at 153 (“The act required that states carry their ‘able-bodied white 
male citizens’ between the ages of eighteen and forty-four on the rolls . . . . But Congress 
also implicitly left the states free to continue the practice of exempting various additional 
categories of citizens . . . . Indeed, Congress also seemingly left open the question of 
states including additional categories of persons—principally, free black males—in their 
state militia rosters, even though no federal service requirement attached to them by vir-
tue of the act.”).  But see Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 22, at 332 (arguing that that the 
Uniform Militia Act, while conscripting only white males, excluded no one from the na-
tion’s militia). 
197 This exclusion of Indians from the protections of the Second Amendment is part and 
parcel with the historical denial of constitutional rights to other groups such as African 
Americans and women.  See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 
(1856) (holding that “a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold 
as slaves” could not “become a member of the political community formed and brought 
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all 
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group, male Indians were excluded by virtue of not being white, as 
well as, potentially, by their lack of citizenship.198  Given that Indians 
were excluded from the militia, they would implicitly lack the right to 
bear arms under the traditional individualist view of the Second 
Amendment.  Thus, their individual right to self-defense would be 
partially abrogated under an originalist understanding of the Second 
Amendment. 
ii. Abraham Lincoln’s 1865 Proclamation 
In 1865, President Abraham Lincoln issued a Proclamation that 
“all persons detected in that nefarious traffic [of furnishing hostile 
Indians with arms and munitions of war] shall be arrested and tried 
by court-martial at the nearest military post.”199  While this Proclama-
tion applied only to provision of arms to “hostile Indians,” the nu-
merous references to “savage Indians” in the case law discussed above 
suggest that hostility may well have been largely in the eye of the be-
holder.  This and similar laws had the effect of indirectly denying In-
dians the right to bear arms and thus the right to effective self-
defense. 
iii. Congressional Resolution of 1876 Prohibiting Conveyance 
of Metallic Ammunition to “Hostile Indians” 
The 1876 Resolution of the Forty-Fourth Congress is similar in 
approach to President Lincoln’s Proclamation in that it also prohi-
bited others from trading arms or related articles with allegedly hos-
tile Indians: 
Whereas, it is ascertained that the hostile Indians of the Northwest are 
largely equipped with arms which require special metallic cartridges, and 
that such special ammunition is in large part supplied to such hostile In-
dians . . . through traders and others in Indian country:  Therefore, Re-
solved . . . That the President . . . is hereby authorized and requested to 
take such measures . . . to prevent such special metallic ammunition be-
 
the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied [sic] by that instrument to the citi-
zen”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (affording women suffrage as of 1920); Ariela 
Gross, When is the Time of Slavery?  The History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal and Political 
Argument, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 298 (2008) (describing Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred 
Scott as “a thoroughgoing exercise of . . . originalism”). 
198 See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 93, at 159 (stating that Indians generally were not made Unit-
ed States citizens until 1924); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006). 
199 Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation No. 28 (Mar. 17, 1865), reprinted in 13 Stat. 753 (1866). 
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ing conveyed to such hostile Indians, and is further authorized to declare 
the same contraband of war in such district of country . . . .200 
Thus, again, we see Indians being denied the right to bear arms—a 
portion of the right to self-defense—through indirect measures. 
iv. 1925–26 United States Code Prohibition on Sale of Arms 
and Ammunition to Uncivilized or Hostile Indians 
In 1925–26, a provision of the United States Code required the Sec-
retary of the Interior to adopt rules and regulations to prohibit the 
sale of arms or ammunition “within any district or country occupied 
by uncivilized or hostile Indians,” and further provided that any In-
dian trader or trader’s agent who violated the rules would forfeit his 
license to trade with the Indians and he or his agent would be ex-
cluded from the applicable district or country.201  When the law was in 
place, such “trading posts were Indians’ only source of supplies.”202 
This law is particularly interesting in that it expands the earlier re-
striction to include “uncivilized” as well as hostile Indians.  Presuma-
bly, many or most Indians would have been considered uncivilized at 
that point in time,203 and the concept of a “civilized Indian” would 
most likely have been reserved for someone who had cut ties with his 
or her tribe and assimilated into white culture.204  Thus, the 1920s saw 
 
200 H.R.J. Res. 20, 44th Cong., 19 Stat. 216 (1876). 
201 25 U.S.C. § 266 (1925–26) (repealed 1953). 
202 Associated Press, Government Drops Restrictions on Sale of Guns to Indians, WASH. POST, Jan. 
6, 1979, at A11 (discussing more recent regulation that incorporated the language from 
this statute); see also Regulating Sale of Arms and Ammunition, 44 Fed. Reg. 46 (Jan. 2, 
1979) (also referring to the later federal regulation and noting that “[c]ircumstances 
which gave rise to this rule no longer exist[]” and that “Indians are now able to purchase 
arms and ammunition at any place they are lawfully for sale”). 
203 For instance, in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), decided just over ten years 
before this statute was enacted, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the Pueblo 
were too advanced to have their lands considered Indian country under U.S. law: 
The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their incli-
nations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, cus-
toms, and domestic government.  Always living in separate and isolated communi-
ties, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and 
fetichism [sic], and chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited 
from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior 
people. 
  Id. at 37–39; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 95, at 27 (noting, “[t]hroughout the nine-
teenth century,” that Indians “were ‘uncivilized’ went without saying”). 
204 See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 1.04 (discussing 
the prominent view during the Allotment Period, which lasted from 1871 to 1928, that 
“tribal autonomy” was a form of “savagery” and the popular demand “that Indians be ab-
sorbed into the mainstream of American life”); Bethany R. Berger, Red:  Racism and the 
American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 606 (2009) (stating that, by the mid-eighteenth 
century, laws began to reflect the view that “[s]eparated from his tribe, the Indian could 
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an expansion of the groups of Indians who were denied the right to 
bear arms potentially to include all tribal Indians. 
v. Federal Regulations Prohibiting Arms Trading with 
Indians 
By 1939, the United States Code provision discussed above had been 
transferred to the Code of Federal Regulations, where it remained, in 
various incarnations, until 1979.205  The 1939 regulation was divided 
between two sections of the Code of Federal Regulations.  The first sec-
tion, 25 C.F.R. § 276.6, substantially mirrored the United States Code 
provision prohibiting the sale of arms and ammunition “within any 
district or country occupied by uncivilized or hostile Indians.”206  The 
second section, 25 C.F.R. § 276.8, went further and prohibited Indian 
traders from selling arms and ammunition to the Indians “except 
upon permission of the superintendent, which will be granted only 
for clearly established lawful purposes.”207  Thus, even Indians who 
were regarded as civilized and friendly by the U.S. government would 
have to prove a “clearly established lawful purpose” before they could 
purchase a gun.  There is evidence that discretionary gun-permitting 
schemes are often enforced in a discriminatory manner,208 and there 
is no reason to think that 25 C.F.R. § 276.8 would have been any dif-
ferent, especially given the entrenched stereotypes of Indians as vio-
lent and irrational.  Again, then, we see that historically, large num-
bers of Indians were denied the right to bear arms, and even those 
that were not so denied were subjected to special burdens. 
These regulations were still in place and remained substantially 
unchanged in 1949.209  By 1966, the first section, prohibiting sales to 
uncivilized and hostile Indians, had been dropped from the Code of 
Federal Regulations, and only the second section, requiring that arms 
and ammunition not be sold to Indians “except upon permission of 
the superintendent which will be granted only for clearly established 
lawful purposes,” remained.210  This section stayed in place until the 
 
be civilized and would thereby add glory of [sic] the English race; tied to it, however, he 
was the enemy of all civilization”). 
205 25 C.F.R. §§ 276.7, 276.8 (1939); Regulating Sale of Arms and Ammunition, 44 Fed. Reg. 
at 46 (revoking restriction on sale of arms and ammunition to Indians because of the ob-
solescence of the rule); Associated Press, supra note 202, at A11. 
206 25 C.F.R. § 276.7. 
207 Id. § 276.8. 
208 See, e.g., Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 81. 
209 25 C.F.R. §§ 276.7, 276.8 (1949). 
210 25 C.F.R. § 251.8 (1966). 
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rule was officially revoked in 1979 due to its obsolescence.211  Thus, 
Indians’ right to bear arms remained explicitly burdened by the law 
until 1979. 
While the federal regulations, United States Code provision, and ear-
lier federal laws referred to Indians rather than tribes, it appears that 
the laws were designed primarily to prevent collective military actions 
by tribes.  This goal is evident from the fact that the laws until 1966 
looked to the character of the Indians in the area, presumably the 
tribe or tribes, in determining the legality of sales, and either sanc-
tioned or prohibited the sales on an across-the-board rather than an 
individualized basis.  Thus, the goal was most likely to prevent tribes 
from engaging in collective violent action including acts of self-
defense, although Indians’ individual rights to bear arms were com-
promised in the process. 
vi. Individual Tribes Were Also Deprived of the Right to 
Self-Defense by the Federal Government 
In addition to the statutes, regulations, and other laws discussed 
above, the federal government also prohibited and prevented indi-
vidual tribes from arming themselves in the face of direct attack, or 
disarmed them and then attacked them, or used their disarmament 
to gain accession to federal demands.  For example, pursuant to 
“general United States policy,” the Department of the Interior in 
1849 refused to give arms and ammunition to the Zuni Tribe to allow 
it to protect itself from attacks by the Navajos and Apaches.212  Moreo-
ver, the federal government, which had promised to defend the Zuni 
from such attacks, failed to do so adequately,213 and the raids there-
fore continued, including kidknappings and livestock thefts.214 
Two other examples involve the Sioux Tribe.  In one case, in 
1876, the Sioux had been disarmed by the federal government and 
then were threatened with denial of rations so that they would cede 
their sacred Black Hills (which the federal government wanted be-
cause gold had been discovered there).215  Because the Indians tradi-
tionally hunted for food and did not know how to farm, without ei-
ther their weapons or government rations, they would have starved.216  
 
211 Regulating Sale of Arms and Ammunition, 44 Fed. Reg. 46 (Jan. 2, 1979). 
212 Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 641, 645 (1987). 
213 Id. at 654. 
214 Id. at 645. 
215 Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1164–66 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Tahmas-
sebi, supra note 17, at 79. 
216 Sioux Nation, 601 F.2d at 1166; Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79. 
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Thus, the federal government appears to have disarmed them not on-
ly to lessen their potential power as opponents, but also in order to 
credibly threaten them with starvation.217 
Another important example involving the Sioux is the United 
States’ infamous massacre at Wounded Knee, where it is estimated 
that in December 1890, nearly 300 Sioux were killed, including many 
women and children who died while fleeing.218  As a precursor to the 
massacre, U.S. troops instructed the Sioux they were traveling with to 
surrender their guns.219  However, the troops were not satisfied that 
all the weapons had been surrendered and began to search each 
Sioux man.220  When a gun went off, the troops began firing on the 
tepees where the women and children were gathered, “pour[ing] in 
2-pound explosive shells at the rate of nearly fifty per minute, mow-
ing down everything alive.”221 
Thus, as shown above, the federal government engaged in a regu-
latory and administrative policy of substantially restricting and often 
prohibiting Indians’ ability to bear arms from 1792 until, at least for-
mally, 1979.222  Such restrictions, along with federal actions directed 
at individual tribes, had the literal effect of denying Indians indivi-
dually, and the tribes to which they belonged collectively, the right to 
bear arms.  Moreover, formal restrictions on Indians’ bearing of arms 
continued long after the Reconstruction-era efforts to remove formal 
 
217 See Sioux Nation, 601 F.2d at 1166; see also Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79. 
218 Allison Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost:  The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization 
Policy in Twentieth-Century Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 797–98 (1997); see also 
Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79–80.  The massacre was born out of the United States’ at-
tempts to suppress a Sioux spiritual practice called the Ghost Dance, which the federal 
government deemed to be dangerous.  Dussias, supra , at 795–98. 
219 Dussias, supra note 218, at 798; see also Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79–80. 
220 Dussias, supra note 218, at 798. 
221 Id. at 798 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
222 A news article from 1979 regarding revocation of the rule reports that the rule had “not 
been used for many years.”  Associated Press, supra note 202, at A11. 
   Despite this general federal history of denying Indians the right to arm themselves in 
self-defense, there were occasional exceptions.  For example, David Kopel examines three 
Supreme Court cases involving Indian defendants from the 1890s in which the Supreme 
Court overturned lower court murder convictions based in part on the defendants’ claims 
that they were acting in self-defense.  See generally David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases:  
How the United States Supreme Court Confronted a Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth Century and 
Taught Some Lessons for Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293 (2000).  Iron-
ically, the views of the trial judge discussed in Kopel’s article, whose death penalty convic-
tions were overturned by the Supreme Court, were lauded and used as persuasive author-
ity to defeat tribal criminal jurisdiction in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 
200 & n.10 (1978).  Kopel, supra, at 298 & n.39; see infra notes 298-310 and accompanying 
text (discussing Oliphant). 
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restrictions on African Americans’ ability to bear arms.223  While this 
information should not be taken, by any means, to suggest that rac-
ism against African Americans has been overcome and racist laws 
consequently abolished,224 it does suggest that Americans are more 
cognizant of the problem of racism against African Americans and, 
therefore, that overtly racist laws have become unacceptable.  In con-
trast, our racism against Indians remains largely invisible to us, and 
laws (including the Supreme Court’s federal common law decisions) 
that racialize Indians may be more difficult to recognize.225  Indeed, 
stereotypes of Indian savagery allowed formal restrictions on Indians 
carrying guns to remain in place until the late 1970s and have con-
tinuing harmful effects upon tribes today. 
b. Colonial and State Prohibitions on Indians’ Bearing Arms 
In addition to federal restrictions and prohibitions, the colonies 
and states also historically outlawed Indians from bearing arms.  Sta-
tutes banning Indians from owning or carrying guns were among the 
first types of gun laws enacted by the colonies and early states, and 
these laws continued to be in place, in some cases, well into the late 
nineteenth century.226  A few examples, arranged chronologically, are 
provided below. 
In 1705, the colony of Virginia had two relevant laws in place.  
The first, discussed above, forbade an Indian from raising his or her 
hand in opposition to a Christian.227  The second allowed Indians to 
fish, oyster, and gather plants provided that they first obtained a li-
 
223 Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 
2809–11 (discussing post-Civil War laws enacted for the benefit of African Americans). 
224 See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 13, at 97–99 (detailing “race neutral” gun control measures in 
the 1960s that were actually aimed at restricting blacks from bearing arms). 
225 Cf. Williams, supra note 104, at 86–87 (elucidating the fact that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), represented a paradigm shift in the Court’s treatment 
of African Americans and other minorities, but that this shift did not occur with respect 
to Indian tribes). 
226 State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1126, 1127 (Or. 2005) (noting that “colonies tried to keep 
arms out of the ‘wrong hands’ by forbidding . . . Native Americans from carrying certain 
weapons” and that states continued firearm regulation designed to disarm Native Ameri-
cans after the Revolutionary War period (citations omitted)); Burkett, supra note 13, at 63 
(noting that colonial authorities “sought to disarm blacks and Indians” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kates, supra note 9, at 241 n.156 (describing laws 
prohibiting gun carrying and ownership by Indians and blacks as one of the four types of 
early gun laws); Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79 & n.51 (citing 1879 Idaho law that for-
bade the “sale or provision of firearms and ammunition to ‘any Indian’” (citation omit-
ted)).   
227 A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS, supra note 184, at 226; see also supra Part II.E.1.a. 
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cense from the Justice of the Peace, but prohibited them from carry-
ing arms and ammunition while doing so.228 
A 1723 Virginia law generally prohibited Indians and blacks from 
possessing arms and ammunition, and provided a punishment of 
whipping for violation.229  The law did, however, provide an exception 
for Indians or blacks living on frontier plantations.230  However, even 
they, if free, were required to first obtain a license from the Justice of 
the Peace or, if enslaved, from the plantation owner.231 
A 1724 Boston law forbade Indians, blacks, and mulattos from car-
rying weapons and additionally “from assembling in groups larger 
than two and from being on the streets from one hour after sundown 
until one hour before sunrise.”232  Oregon’s first firearms restriction 
after statehood was directed at Native Americans.233  It became effec-
tive in 1864 and “prohibited selling or giving any firearms or ammu-
nition to any Native American without the authority of the United 
States.”234  Finally, in 1879, Idaho “prohibited the sale or provision of 
firearms to ‘any Indian.’”235 
This sampling of historical state and colonial gun control meas-
ures directed at Indians demonstrates the extent to which states and 
colonies, like the federal government, viewed Indians as untrustwor-
thy (i.e. as savage) or, in other words, as violent and irrational.  As a 
result of this distorted perception, states and colonies worked to limit 
Indians’ access to guns while allowing members of the dominant 
white population to use and carry them.236  The state attempts are 
particularly striking given that, since the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, states have been generally considered barred from regulating 
 
228 A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS, supra note 184, at 231.  The license required was also 
quite restrictive, defining the amount of time the Indian fisher or gatherer was allowed to 
engage in such activities.  Id. 
229 A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS, supra note 184, at 342. 
230 Id. at 231. 
231 Id.  
232 Bogus, supra note 9, at 1370 & n.31. 
233 State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1120 (Or. 2005). 
234 Id. 
235 Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79 & n.51. 
236 This strategy is in sync with an often overlooked aspect of gun armament:  it only affords 
a true advantage if the other side is not so armed.  See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 13, at 77 
(“[T]he peculiar advantage of owning a repeating firearm like the Colt is not realized in a 
gunfight against an equally armed opponent.  Rather, it lies in the capacity of a technolo-
gically advanced weapon to enable its user to defeat larger numbers of less well-armed ad-
versaries.  In short, the gun permits its holder to transcend his perceived position of infe-
riority and to gain superiority over, rather than equality with, his adversaries.” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Indians, at least on-reservation.237  Like the analogous federal laws, 
these state and colonial laws raise elemental questions about the right 
to self-defense, and in fact suggest that it was meant as a privilege for 
the dominant white population to be used to subjugate and oppress 
members of those unarmed minority groups who found themselves at 
the other end of the gun barrel.238 
V.  THE STEREOTYPES OF INDIANS AS WARLIKE SAVAGES ARE STILL USED 
TO DEPRIVE TRIBES OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TODAY 
While formal restrictions on Indians’ gun ownership have now 
been abolished, the American legacy of fear of Indians based on a 
perception of savagery continues to plague tribes.  Currently, al-
though other ramifications exist,239 the most salient effect of this fear 
 
237 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (striking down a Georgia law 
that prohibited white persons from living on Indian land unless they had satisfied condi-
tions imposed by state law). 
238 See, e.g, Bogus, supra note 9, at 1369 (explaining that, in 1517, the “non-white world liter-
ally found itself looking down the barrel of a gun”); id. at 1370 (“Guns were important to 
enforcing white control.  The strategy was twofold:  to keep guns out of the hands of 
blacks and Indians and to keep white men well-armed.”); cf. Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 
79 (“The history of firearms prohibitions in regard to Native Americans presents 
a[n] . . . example of the use of gun control to oppress and . . . exterminate, a non-white 
ethnic group.”). 
239 For instance, in June 2000, the Washington State Republican Party passed a resolution 
“calling for the abolition of tribal governments” by “whatever steps necessary,” and the 
resolution’s author specifically threatened the use of “the U.S. Army and the Air Force 
and the Marines and the National Guard” to effect the abolition.  Julie Titone, Resolution 
Would End Tribal Sovereignty:  If Indians Don’t Like it, Send in the Troops, GOP Delegate Says, 
SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane, Wash.), July 3, 2000, at A1 (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  The resolution was recognized as racist by both anti-racism organi-
zations and tribal rights groups.  Jim Camden & Julie Titone, Anti-sovereignty Resolution 
Draws Fire; Some Call GOP Action Racist,; [sic] Others Say It’s Simply Misguided, SPOKESMAN 
REV. (Spokane, Wash.), July 8, 2000, at A1; see also Berger, supra note 204, at 647 (“The 
denigration of tribal governments . . . has lain at the heart of racism against Indian tri-
bes.”).  In a similar vein, in August 2010, New York City’s mayor offensively urged the 
governor to enforce cigarette tax laws pertaining to on-reservation sales by getting himself 
“a cowboy hat and a shotgun.”  Sarah Moses, CNY Native Americans Call New York City 
Mayor Bloomberg’s “Cowboy Hat” Remark Racist, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug. 24, 2010, 6:59 AM).  
Other ramifications include race-based physical and verbal harassment of tribal members 
who exercise treaty fishing rights, see generally Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wis., 843 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Wisc. 1994) (holding 
that Indians’ treaty fishing right was violated when protestors battered and assaulted them 
to block their access to the waterfront), and dehumanizing views of Indians as bloodthirs-
ty savages in advertising, see, e.g., Michael K. Green, Images of Native Americans in Advertis-
ing:  Some Moral Issues, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 323, 324, 328–29 (1993).  Even in the generally 
very progressive realm of contemporary poetry, one can find examples of Indians being 
portrayed as savages.  For instance, in the poem “God Ode,” Kim Addonizio describes In-
dians as the metaphorical enemy of the speaker’s body.  The poem begins:  “Praise having 
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is that tribes’ sovereign rights are diminished based on early case law 
that defined them as savage.  This abrogation of sovereignty, particu-
larly jurisdiction over non-members, renders tribes very vulnerable to 
outside depredations, effectively leaving them unable to defend 
themselves. 
A. Stereotypes of Savagery Are Implicitly at Work in Case Law 
Robert Williams quotes Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu v. 
United States240 to explain how the racist precedents using the lan-
guage of Indian savagery continue to plague current Indian law deci-
sions and to implicitly justify abrogation of tribal rights:241 
Justice Jackson focused his . . . dissenting opinion . . . upon the larger set 
of constitutional values that were threatened by the Court’s hold-
ing . . . . “But once a judicial opinion rationalizes . . . an order [such as 
the military order justifying Korematsu’s exclusion and detention] to 
show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Con-
stitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order . . . the 
Court has for all time validated the principle of racial discrimina-
tion.” . . . [T]he principle validated in that opinion now “lies about like a 
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring for-
ward a plausible claim of an urgent need.  Every repetition imbeds that 
principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new 
purposes.” . . . Jackson described what happens when the Supreme Court 
reviews and approves a principle of racial discrimination as the doctrine 
of the Constitution:  “There it has a generative power of its own, and all 
that it creates will be in its own image.”242 
In the case of tribes, Williams explains, the “racist precedents and 
language of Indian savagery used and relied upon by the justices [of 
the Supreme Court] . . . have most often worked . . . to justify denial 
to Indians of important rights of property, self-government, and cul-
tural survival.”243  Thus, absent the stereotyping of savagery, “there is 
usually no other stated justification to be found for the way that In-
dians are treated by the justices.”244  While Supreme Court Justices are 
no longer likely to describe tribes as savages or to insert quotes in 
their opinions that contain such language, they continue to rely on 
the precedents that do use that language, precedents that not only 
 
a body to be unhappy in,/ suffering the slings and staring unbelieving at the arrows/ bris-
tling from your chest as the Indians creep closer.”  KIM ADDONIZIO, God Ode, in LUCIFER 
AT THE STARLITE 78 (2009). 
240 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
241 WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at xxv, 29. 
242 Id. at 29 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
243 Id. at xxv. 
244 Id. 
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were infected by racialized portrayals of Indians, but also, to a signifi-
cant extent were based on such portrayals.245  These precedents de-
nied tribes sovereign rights based in large part on the implicit justifi-
cation of Indian savagery.  When these precedents are relied upon 
now, they are expanded (to use Williams’s terminology) to justify 
even greater incursions upon tribal sovereignty.  The same principle 
applies to opinions produced by lower federal, as well as state, courts, 
although, as discussed above, such courts are more likely to include 
explicitly the language of savagism in opinions.246 
Thus, usually without appearing to do so, current Supreme Court 
cases and other cases from the state and federal system validate, per-
petuate, and reinforce this racialization.247  In other words, given that 
the language of Indian savagery stems in significant part from tribal 
efforts to defend their homelands, Indians are still being punished 
for their historical acts of self-defense.  As this punishment has per-
sisted for nearly 400 years in some cases, tribes cannot be said to have 
any current right to self-defense, irrespective of whether or not they 
can now buy guns or form militias.  This is particularly true given that 
the abrogations of tribal sovereignty that are based implicitly on the 
imputation of savagery (and thus in significant part on past acts of 
self-defense) literally render tribes defenseless against outsiders. 
First of all, all five Supreme Court cases discussed in Part IV.B.3 
have been cited in recent Supreme Court and other state and federal 
court decisions.248  Since 1975, Worcester, for example, has been cited 
in 392 state and federal cases, including thirty-five U.S. Supreme 
 
245 See id. at 49 (discussing the Supreme Court’s continued reliance on Johnson, Worcester, and 
Cherokee Nation). 
246 But see id. at 121 (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 
U.S. 371, 437 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in which the Justice, quoting a historian, 
described the Sioux as “liv[ing] only for the day, recogniz[ing] no rights of property, 
robb[ing] or kill[ing] anyone if they . . . could get away with it, inflict[ing] cruelty with-
out a qualm, and endur[ing] torture without flinching”).  Note that not only is an ex-
tremely violent, or savage, character imputed to the Sioux in this quote, but that the 
Sioux people are also dehumanized based on their supposed immunity to pain, a charac-
teristic that implies that we can justify doing whatever we want to them because they will 
not feel it.  United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 437 (1980) (Rehnquist, dissent-
ing).  Thus, in this quote, former Chief Justice Rehnquist demonstrates how the language 
of savagery can be used to justify violence against supposedly savage groups. Id.; see also 
supra Part II.B & IV.D. 
247 Cf. Anthony Cook, Cultural Racism and the Limits of Rationality in the Saga of Rodney King, 70 
DENVER UNIV. L. REV. 297, 302 (1993) (“After centuries of life predicated on the assump-
tions of white supremacy, society finally reaches a point at which the assumptions no 
longer need stating.  They provide the backdrop for conversations, interactions and en-
counters that never utter a racist word, but yet reproduce the imagery of supremacy and 
inferiority that perpetuates the subordination of blacks in society.”). 
248 “Recent” here is defined as any case published after December 31, 1975. 
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Court cases.249  A case with a decidedly more negative holding for tri-
bes, Cherokee Nation has been cited in 268 state and federal cases since 
1975, including twenty-two Supreme Court cases.  Finally, Johnson, the 
least positive for tribes out of these three Indian law decisions written 
by Chief Justice Marshall,250 has been cited in 110 post-1975 state and 
federal cases, including ten Supreme Court cases.  As for Crow Dog, it 
has been cited in a total of eighty-one state and federal court cases 
since 1975, including seven Supreme Court cases.  Lastly, Tee-Hit-Ton 
has been cited in fifty-nine post-1975 state and federal cases, includ-
ing three Supreme Court cases.  The language of savagery lives on, 
however, even in recent Indian law cases that do not cite to any of 
these five cases.  This is because recent opinions commonly cite earli-
er cases that have themselves relied on racialized precedents such as 
these five cases.  An extended example of how citation of early racia-
lized decisions inscribes racism into current decisions is described be-
low.  Before delving into this example, however, I wish to provide a 
brief overview of the status of tribes generally under federal law and 
of the criminal and civil jurisdictional frameworks for cases arising 
within reservations or involving tribes. 
1. The Status of Tribes Under Federal Law 
“[T]he relationship of Indian tribes to the National Government” 
under federal law is widely understood to be “‘an anomalous one and 
of a complex character.’”251  For example, in Cherokee Nation,252 dis-
cussed earlier, tribes were held to be “‘domestic, dependent nations’ 
who enjoyed a ‘quasi-sovereign status’” under federal law.253  However, 
later federal cases and other federal actions, such as the Allotment 
Policy, which was in place from the 1880s through the 1920s, viewed 
tribes as “wards of the state” and pursued an “aggressive policy of as-
similating tribal members”254 by confiscating tribal land and parceling 
 
249 These counts include majority, concurring, dissenting, and plurality opinions. 
250 See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 674. 
251 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 226 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted); see also Erich W. Steinman, Legitimizing American Indian Sovereignty:  Mobilizing the 
Constitutive Power of Law Through Institutional Entrepreneurship, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 759, 765 
(2005) (describing tribes as holding an “anomalous and ambiguous status” under federal 
law as they entered the 1970s). 
252 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
253 Steinman, supra note 251, at 765 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 7) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (refer-
ring to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s “quasi-sovereign” status). 
254 Steinman, supra note 251, at 765. 
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it out to individual Indians and non-Indians.255  The Allotment Policy 
was followed by yet more reversals in federal policy, including the In-
dian New Deal of the 1930s, which reflected a legislative policy in fa-
vor of tribal self-determination, the termination era of the 1950s, 
which constituted a reversion to harsh, assimilationist policies, and 
the current self-determination era ushered in by President Nixon in 
1970.256  Despite the fact that current legislative and executive policy 
supports tribal self-determination, however, the Supreme Court has, 
since its 1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,257 consis-
tently diminished sovereignty over non-members, largely on its own 
initiative.258 
Great disparities in federal treatment of tribes in different eras 
and even within the same era by different branches of government 
are possible (1) because federal Indian law is largely a creature of 
federal common law;259 (2) because Congress has been held to have 
virtually unlimited “plenary power” over tribes;260 and (3) because the 
Supreme Court has invested itself with the power to construct (and 
especially to diminish) tribal sovereignty under federal law according 
to its own policy determinations.261  The fact that court decisions and 
statutes from eras of conflicting policy remain good law simulta-
neously has created a schizophrenic body of law, as Erich Steinman 
sums up: 
Lacking comprehensive constitutional foundations, federal Indian law 
has been, as described by legal scholars, “bizarre” and a “middle-eastern 
bazaar where practically anything is available.” . . . Indian law expert 
Charles F. Wilkinson identifies two uniquely divergent lines of opinion is-
sued by the Supreme Court.  One set casts tribal governments as largely 
autonomous under overriding federal authority but free of state control.  
In the other, tribes are understood as wards of the federal government.  
Indian law is “time-warped,” as conflicting rulings are based on laws or 
 
255 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a “Mere 
Change in the Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37, 43–47 (2002). 
256 Steinman, supra note 251, at 765. 
257 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
258 See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 674–83 (discussing the Court’s divestment of tribal sove-
reignty during the past three decades). 
259 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 207 (2004)(“Consequently we do not read 
any of these cases as holding that the Constitution forbids Congress to change ‘judicially 
made’ federal Indian law through this kind of legislation.”); see also, Tweedy, supra note 
57, at 664 n.55 (describing the foundational decisions of Indian law as primarily federal 
common law decisions). 
260 See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 659–62, 659 nn.31 & 34 (describing and discussing the ori-
gins and virtually unlimited character of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs). 
261 See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 674–83 (discussing the Court’s divestment of tribal sove-
reignty during the past three decades). 
742 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
policy generated in different eras and reflect variants of these two inter-
pretations of tribal status.  The underlying ambiguity has resulted in 
widely divergent perceptions—and rulings—even though “tribal sove-
reignty” has nonetheless remained an active principle. . . . 
And as legal anthropologist Thomas Biolsi has pointed out, the con-
tradictions within Indian law elicited (and still do today) continual chal-
lenges even to those tribal rights affirmed by specific court rulings.  
Comparing Indian law to racial discrimination law, Biolsi asks “What 
things would be like if the laws of slavery and the 13th through 15th 
amendments to the Constitution were equally on the books, or if both 
Plessy v. Ferguson . . . and Brown v. Board of Education were equally ‘good 
law’ in the present.”  Such conditions invite virtually ongoing litigation.262 
a. Criminal Jurisdiction for On-Reservation Crimes 
The determination of criminal jurisdiction for on-reservation 
crimes is so complicated as to have been termed a “maze”263 and a 
“morass.”264  Among the most troubling aspects of the maze are the 
limitations on tribal jurisdiction effected by statute and by Supreme 
Court decisions, which are discussed below. 
i. Tribal Jurisdiction 
In an Indian reservation, Indian allotment, or other dependent 
Indian community,265 tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their 
members as well as other Indians.266  However, under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, the sentences they may impose are limited generally to a 
prison term of one year, a fine of $5,000, or both267 (although under a 
2010 law called the Tribal Law and Order Act,268 tribes are able to im-
pose sentences of up to three years and fines of up to $15,000 if cer-
 
262 Steinman, supra note 251, at 766–67 (citations omitted). 
263 See generally AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE:  THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS 
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 8 (2007) (reporting on the complex “maze” 
of tribal, state, and federal law that makes it extremely challenging for Native American 
victims of sexual violence to achieve justice). 
264 Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty:  Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent 
Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1182 (2004) (“[T]he federal statutory scheme addressing 
crimes in Indian country creates a confusing morass in which tribes, states, and the feder-
al government may, depending on various factors, have exclusive or concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction.”). 
265 See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining “Indian country” as including Indian allotments, 
Indian communities, and “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation”). 
266 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (defining tribal “powers of self-government”); United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).   
267 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7). 
268 Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, §§ 201–66, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 
Stat. 2258, 2261–62. 
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tain requirements are met).269  Moreover, although tribes, being nei-
ther federal nor state actors, are not generally bound by constitution-
al provisions requiring protection of individual rights,270 most Bill of 
Rights protections have been imposed on tribes through the Indian 
Civil Rights Act (ICRA).271  The most notable exception in the crimi-
nal milieu is the right to counsel for an indigent defendant,272 al-
though tribes that impose the stronger punishments now available 
under the Tribal Law and Order Act must provide indigent defen-
dants with the right to an attorney.273 
Although under the Major Crimes Act,274 federal courts have juris-
diction over enumerated Indian-on-Indian felonies such as murder 
and rape, some courts have held that tribal courts retain concurrent 
jurisdiction in such cases.275  Furthermore, the only federal review 
available of a tribally imposed conviction is habeas corpus.276 
ii. Federal Jurisdiction 
As noted above, the federal government has jurisdiction over cer-
tain major crimes committed by an Indian against an Indian on the 
reservation.277  The federal government also has jurisdiction over on-
reservation crimes involving a non-Indian perpetrator and an Indian 
 
269 25 U.S.C. § 1302; Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010 § 234(a).  
270 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381–83 (1896) (stating that powers of the local gov-
ernment exercised by the Cherokee nation are not derived from the Constitution); Barta 
v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation of South Dakota, 259 F.2d 553, 556–57 
(8th Cir. 1958) (holding that because Indian tribes are not states, constitutional limits on 
legislative actions by states under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to 
them). 
271 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 
272 See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 14.04[2] (noting 
that the ICRA omits the Constitutional requirements of free counsel for indigent defen-
dants and that ICRA’s legislative history “indicates that these omissions reflect a delibe-
rate choice by Congress to limit its intrusion into traditional tribal independence”); Will 
Trachman, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction After U.S. v. Lara:  Answering Constitutional Challenges 
to the Duro Fix, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 880 (2005) (“Thus even though state and federal 
courts must provide indigent defendants with assistance of counsel free of charge, neither 
the federal Constitution nor the terms of ICRA require tribes [to do so] in tribal 
courts.”). 
273 Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010 § 234(a)(2). 
274 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
275 See, e.g., Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (“That the tribes retain jurisdic-
tion over crimes within the Major Crimes Act is the conclusion already reached by distin-
guished authorities on the subject.”). 
276 25 U.S.C. § 1303; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (“[T]he 
structure of the statutory scheme and the legislative history of Title I suggest that Con-
gress’ failure to provide remedies other than habeas corpus was a deliberate one.”). 
277 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
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victim or vice versa under the Indian Country Crimes Act278 and the 
Assimilative Crimes Act.279 
iii. State Jurisdiction 
States have jurisdiction over crimes between one non-Indian and 
another within Indian country.280  Additionally, under a federal law 
popularly known as Public Law 280,281 some states, as a substitute for 
federal jurisdiction, have additional criminal jurisdiction over Indian 
country.282  Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that tribes have 
concurrent jurisdiction with states in these circumstances to the same 
extent they otherwise would have had with the federal government.283  
In Alaska, matters are further complicated by the general absence of 
Indian country, which appears to leave the state having broad juris-
diction over native villages, at least in the criminal context.284  Finally, 
states have jurisdiction over crimes not in Indian country regardless 
of the perpetrator’s and victim’s Indian status or lack thereof.285   
As this framework makes abundantly clear, determining what gov-
ernment has jurisdiction over a crime committed in Indian country is 
no simple matter.  Moreover, in some states, such as Oklahoma, 
where extensive allotment has occurred, the determination of wheth-
 
278 Id. § 1152; see also Washburn, supra note 157, at 716–17 (discussing the framework of fed-
eral jurisdiction created by the Indian country statute, the Major Crimes Act, and the 
General Crimes Act). 
279 18 U.S.C. § 13; see also Washburn, supra note 157, at 716–17 (“[T]he Assimilative Crimes 
Act[] provides that any state criminal law of the state in which the lands are located can 
be assimilated if there is no federal criminal law on point.” (footnote omitted)). 
280 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 621–22 (1881). 
281 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). 
282 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 6.04[3] (explaining the 
history of Public Law 280 and the state jurisdiction that it authorizes); see also MAZE OF 
INJUSTICE, supra note 263, at 29 (“Public Law 280 is seen by many Indigenous peoples as 
an affront to tribal sovereignty, not least because states have the option to assume and to 
relinquish jurisdiction, a power not extended to the Indigenous peoples affected.  In ad-
dition, Congress failed to provide additional funds to Public Law 280 states to support the 
law enforcement activities they had assumed.”). 
283 Tweedy, supra note 57, at 694. 
284 Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 533 (1998) (“These [current 
federal] protections, if they can be called that, simply do not approach the level of supe-
rintendence over Indians’ land  that existed in our prior cases.”); MAZE OF INJUSTICE, su-
pra note 263, at 36–37 (“A combination of federal legislation and state and US [stet] Su-
preme Court decisions . . . has resulted in considerable confusion and debate over the 
right of Alaska Native peoples to maintain tribal police and court systems.”); cf. COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 4.07[3][d] (“[The Alaska Court’s 
decision] suggests that Alaska native villages retain authority over other matters con-
nected to core tribal interests, regardless of the absence of Indian country.”). 
285 See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 9.03[1]. 
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er an area is Indian country may take weeks or even months.286  Given 
this framework and the fact that criminal perpetrators naturally try to 
hide their identities and, in these circumstances, may also try to hide 
their races,287 it is not surprising that there is considerable difficulty in 
bringing criminals to justice or that such obstacles help create an at-
mosphere of lawlessness on many reservations. 
a. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction 
Tribal civil jurisdiction has become exceedingly complicated, and 
a thorough analysis of the subject could easily span 100 or more pag-
es.  However, below is an abbreviated overview of the subject.  Tribes 
generally have regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over their 
members, whereas tribal jurisdiction over non-members has been in-
creasingly circumscribed.288  Absent federal delegation or congres-
sional restoration of tribal sovereignty,289 the general rule of when tri-
bes have civil jurisdiction over non-members was enunciated in 
Montana v. United States: 
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the ac-
tivities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe 
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.  A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil 
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reserva-
tion when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the politi-
cal integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.290 
While Montana’s limitations on civil jurisdiction over non-members 
originally only applied to tribal regulatory jurisdiction (rather than 
adjudicatory jurisdiction) and applied only to non-Indian-owned fee 
lands within reservations, the limitations have been expanded with 
 
286 MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 263, at 34 (noting the difficulty in determining the status 
of land in Oklahoma). 
287 See ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST:  SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 26 
(2005) (listing examples to support the claim that both today and historically white men 
who raped and murdered Indian women would try to attribute this crime to Indian men); 
see also Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Methamphetamine:  Casting a Shadow Across Disciplines and Ju-
risdictions, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 (2006). 
288 See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 4.02 (highlighting 
federally imposed limitations on tribal powers). 
289 See generally Tweedy, supra note 57 (discussing the potential for congressional restoration 
of tribal sovereignty); Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword:  Tribal Civil Regulatory 
Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act After United States v. Lara, 35 ENVTL. L. 471, 473–74 
(2005) (discussing delegation of federal power to tribes). 
290 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (citations omitted). 
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each new case heard by the Supreme Court.291  Thus, for example, 
under current law, jurisdiction over state rights-of-way through tribal-
ly owned land on the reservation is subject to a Montana analysis,292 
and, more importantly, ownership of land may have become merely 
one factor in the analysis as to whether the Montana limitations on 
tribal jurisdiction apply at all.293  Furthermore, with respect to Mon-
tana’s consensual relationship exception, the Court has required that 
there be a stringent nexus between the consensual relationship and 
the tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction,294 and the Court has concluded 
that land sales by non-members on the reservation are not “activities” 
for purposes of the consensual relationship exception.295  Finally, the 
Court has dismissed the applicability of the second exception, relat-
ing to the tribe’s health, welfare, political integrity, or economic se-
curity, when a tribe could not plausibly claim “catastrophic conse-
quences” as a result of the non-member’s actions.296  These are only a 
few of the ways that the Court has limited the Montana language to 
further narrow tribal jurisdiction.  As I suggested in a previous article, 
it is possible that the Montana exceptions’ primary function in the 
Supreme Court is “to exist in theory but never actually apply.”297  
Thus, while tribes may legally exercise civil authority over non-
members under Montana, they have had tremendous difficulty in get-
ting the Supreme Court to enforce this right in individual cases. 
 
291 See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 674–76, 678, 703 & nn.256 & 257 (listing various cases 
where the Supreme Court limited tribal power). 
292 See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (citing Montana as the “pathmark-
ing case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers” and applying its analysis); see 
also Tweedy, supra note 93, at 171 (analyzing Strate as narrowing the Montana holding to 
apply only to certain circumstances). 
293 See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 678 (summarizing Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), in 
which the Supreme Court held that a tribal member could not bring a § 1983 claim 
against a state officer who executed a search warrant on tribal land). 
294 See id. (discussing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), and its changes to 
the Montana test). 
295 See id. at 681 (examining Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 
2709 (2008), in which the Supreme Court held that a tribal court did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear a discrimination case seeking to set aside the sale of fee land on a reservation 
pursuant to a deed of trust and requesting a variety of other remedies). 
296 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2726 (2008). 
297 Tweedy, supra note 57, at 682. 
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2. An Extended Example of the Language of Savagery at Work in Supreme 
Court Case Law 
In Oliphant,298 the Court relied on very questionable sources, such 
as “unspoken assumption[s]” and withdrawn administrative opinions, 
to effect a devastating blow to tribal sovereignty, the revocation of tri-
bes’ criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.299  As further discussed 
below, this holding has played a substantial part in exposing tribes to 
widespread lawlessness nationwide,300 thus rendering tribes literally 
unable to defend themselves from violence.301 
In Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Oliphant, he quoted 
Crow Dog, including the Crow Dog opinion’s most offensive passage 
emphasizing that it would be unfair to “measure[] the red man’s re-
venge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.”302  However, Jus-
tice Rehnquist carefully elided the portions of the Crow Dog passage 
that defined Indians as savages because he was using the Crow Dog 
passage in Oliphant to underscore that it would be unfair to outsiders 
(namely whites) to allow Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over them.303  He was thus putting whites in the place of the In-
dian defendant in Crow Dog, but could hardly convincingly describe 
whites as savages,304 as this would not only presumably conflict with his 
own worldview but would also lack cultural resonance.  By making 
this strategic use of ellipses, Justice Rehnquist was able to preserve a 
sanitized version of the offensive language in Crow Dog and then use it 
to deny Indians the right to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.  
The racialized language of savagery from Crow Dog was therefore at 
work in Oliphant, but in a way that would not have been readily ascer-
 
298 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
299 Id. at 203 (relying on Congress’ “unspoken assumption” that tribes lacked such jurisdic-
tion); see also Tweedy, supra note 93, at 151–52 (noting the “dubious evidence” supporting 
the Court’s decision in Oliphant). 
300 See, e.g., Trachman, supra note 272, at 854 (“The Oliphant decision led to an atmosphere 
of lawlessness on tribal reservations and substantially hindered the ability of tribal gov-
ernments and police to combat crimes committed by non-Indians on reservations.”). 
301 For an example of a tribal court case that analyzes the question of criminal jurisdiction 
over non-members (in this case non-member Indians) as a self-defense issue, see Means v. 
District Court of the Chinle Judicial Dist., 7 Navajo Rptr. 383, 386 (1999), available at 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/1999.NANN.0000013.htm (noting that “[t]he 
social health of the Navajo Nation is at risk . . . as is the actual health and well-being of 
thousands of people” as a result of non-member on-reservation crime). 
302 WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 109 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210–11 (1978); Ex Parte 
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 536, 571 (1883)). 
303 See id. at 108–09 (examining Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning in Oliphant). 
304 Id. 
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tainable to one not versed in Indian law.305  Moreover, the notion of 
tribes as untrustworthy that pervades Oliphant can be linked to the 
stereotype of savagery, specifically, to the conception of tribes as un-
predictable aggressors.306 
In Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist also made use of Johnson, Cherokee 
Nation, and Worcester.  He used the doctrine of discovery from Johnson 
as a springboard for the idea that Indian tribes’ rights are necessarily 
implicitly “‘diminished’” in myriad ways as a result of their incorpora-
tion into the United States—ways that, based on Oliphant and subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions, appear to remain obscure until the 
Court elucidates them.307  Justice Rehnquist similarly used Cherokee Na-
tion’s somewhat limited acknowledgement that, because tribes were 
“completely” under the sovereignty of the United States, a foreign na-
tion’s attempt to acquire either their land or a connection with them 
would be considered an affront to the United States to support the 
expansive holding that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians for crimes committed on the reservation.308  Finally, Justice 
Rehnquist questionably used Worcester to support the notion that the 
Suquamish Tribe’s generic acknowledgement of “dependence” on 
the United States in its treaty actually signified that the tribe con-
sented to cede its criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the feder-
al government.309 
Thus, Oliphant demonstrates that the elements of racial animus in 
Chief Justice Marshall’s trilogy of Indian law decisions have func-
tioned to exponentially reduce tribal sovereignty, despite the positive 
aspects of the early decisions.310  In other words, as Justice Jackson 
recognized in his Korematsu dissent, the racist principle, once vali-
dated in a judicial opinion, “‘lies about like a loaded weapon ready 
 
305 See id. at 108–10 (“[T]he same basic nineteenth-century racist attitude of Indian cultural 
inferiority found in Crow Dog is now being applied to Indians once again . . . .”). 
306 Accord Kates, supra note 9, at 217 n.54 (“The original intention [of the Second Amend-
ment] would unquestionably also have been to exclude Indians and blacks on the 
grounds of alienage or untrustworthiness.”). 
307 See WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 98 (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191, 209 (1978)). 
308 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1978); see also WILLIAMS, su-
pra note 104, at 99 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18–19 
(1831)). 
309 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206-07 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832)); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 106–07 (analyzing Rehnquist’s use of Worce-
ster in Oliphant).  This holding is completely at odds with Worcester in that the Court in 
Worcester was careful to construe tribal cessions made in treaties narrowly.  See, e.g., Twee-
dy, supra note 57, at 671–72. 
310 See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 673–74 (discussing the positive aspects of the three deci-
sions). 
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for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim 
of urgent need.  Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply 
in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.’”311 
Oliphant was not only a highly significant blow to tribal rights in its 
own right, but, importantly, the Court has also expanded it exponen-
tially to reduce tribal sovereignty even further.312  Thus, even when 
the antecedent decisions that Oliphant was based on are not them-
selves cited, the racialized language of savagery in them continues to 
operate through Oliphant and its progeny to deprive tribes of their 
sovereign rights.  Indeed, Oliphant has been cited in 265 federal and 
state cases, including twenty-two Supreme Court cases, since it was 
decided in 1978. 
Moreover, both Oliphant and Worcester were cited in the Court’s 
2008 decision, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.313  
In Long Family Land & Cattle, the Court further reduced tribes’ al-
ready drastically curtailed sovereignty over non-members, overturn-
ing a tribal court jury verdict in a discrimination case against a non-
member bank on the basis that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction.314 
The Long Family Land & Cattle Court expanded further Oliphant’s 
holding that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-members, 
and it also expanded the holdings of subsequent cases extending Oli-
phant’s holding to the civil context.315  One such intervening case, 
Montana v. United States,316 had expanded Oliphant’s idea of implicit 
abrogations of tribal sovereignty due to alleged inconsistence with the 
 
311 WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 29 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
312 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 137–48 (discussing the Court’s use of Oliphant in 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)); see also Tweedy, supra note 57, at 675–83 (discussing 
the Court’s trend of divesting tribal sovereignty as beginning with, and being rooted in, 
Oliphant). 
313 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2718–19, 2723 (2008). 
314 Id. at 2720 (holding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to hear a discrimination 
claim against defendant bank because the tribe lacked the civil authority to regulate the 
bank’s sale of its fee land); see also Tweedy, supra note 57, at 679–83 (discussing how Long 
Family Land & Cattle further reduced tribal sovereignty). 
315 See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374–75 (2001) (holding that tribes have no juris-
diction to adjudicate claims that state officials violated tribal law in the performance of 
their duties); State v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459–60 (1997) (holding that the tri-
bal court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a civil tort claim because tribal adjudica-
tion is not necessary to protect tribal self-government); Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544, 566–67 (1981) (holding that the tribal court lacked civil jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate claims involving non-Indian hunters and fishers on non-Indian fee land).  All three 
cases are cited in Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2718–19. 
316 Montana, 450 U.S. at 549 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 
(1978)); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 139 (describing how Montana expanded Oli-
phant’s jurisdictional limitations to the civil sphere). 
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tribes’ dependence on the United States to the civil arena.317  As al-
luded to above, Montana had held that tribes’ civil regulatory jurisdic-
tion over non-member activities on non-Indian owned fee land within 
the reservation was abrogated as a result of the tribes’ dependent re-
lationship except in certain circumstances, such as when the non-
members had entered into consensual relationships with the tribe or 
its members.318 
As one of the remedies the plaintiffs sought in Long Family Land & 
Cattle was setting aside the defendant bank’s foreclosure sale of their 
property, the Court was able to decide the case without rigorously ex-
amining the Montana rule.  Instead, the Court paradoxically held that 
the Montana rule was not at all applicable because land sale was not 
an “activity” under Montana.319  Thus the Court used Oliphant implicit-
ly through Montana to derogate tribal rights. 
The Court in Long Family Land & Cattle also cited Oliphant directly 
for the proposition that tribes have lost the right to govern anyone in 
their territory except themselves.320   Oliphant’s use of that statement 
was limited to tribal criminal jurisdiction; it had since been expanded 
to civil jurisdiction subject to the exceptions laid out in Montana.321  
 
317 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66 (expanding the Oliphant principles to hold that the tribe 
lacked jurisdiction in a civil regulatory matter). 
318 Id. at 565 (“A tribe may regulate . . . the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leas-
es, or other arrangements.”). 
319 Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2724 (distinguishing the resale of land from the 
uses to which the land is put); see also Tweedy, supra note 57, at 679–82 (discussing the 
Court’s decision in Long Family Land & Cattle, including the opinion’s failure to reckon 
with the Montana exceptions). 
320 Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2719 (citing Oliphant to support the proposition 
that tribes have no right to govern anyone in their territory besides themselves).  Interes-
tingly, in making this statement, the Oliphant Court is itself quoting an 1810 case called 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810), which states that “[a]ll the restrictions 
upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of all competitors from 
their markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of govern-
ing every person within their limits except themselves.”  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (citing Fletcher for the proposition that the overriding so-
vereignty of the United States restricts tribal authority from governing people other than 
themselves).  However, as might be expected, Oliphant is expanding the principle, which 
was not only dicta in Fletcher but also appears to be more of an assertion of the federal 
government’s right to regulate outsiders within Indian reservations than a derogation of 
the tribes’ rights to do so.  Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147 (mentioning limitations on 
tribal authority to govern outsiders in a paragraph describing the United States’ legal in-
terests in Indian lands). 
321 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (“Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in 
criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that 
the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-
members of the tribe.” (citation omitted)). 
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The Long Family Land & Cattle decision represents yet another expan-
sion, apparently holding that tribes may not regulate land sales in-
volving non-members even if a consensual relationship has been es-
tablished.322  Thus, the principles of Oliphant were used in Long Family 
Land & Cattle to implement yet another novel limitation on tribal 
rights.  Without the specter of savagery, it is hard to see why the court 
has so much difficulty in entrusting tribes with the territorial jurisdic-
tion that is rightfully theirs. 
Worcester is also cited in Long Family Land & Cattle in a puzzling 
and somewhat misleading way.323  Worcester held that Georgia lacked 
jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation’s tribal territory and concomi-
tantly emphasized the Cherokee Nation’s right to decide who entered 
its territory.324  But Chief Justice Roberts uses Worcester’s holding to 
support his statement that tribes lack jurisdiction over their reserva-
tions unless they actually own the land:  “[b]y virtue of their incorpo-
ration into the United States, the tribe’s sovereign interests are now 
confined to managing tribal land.”325  Worcester nowhere suggests that 
land ownership inside a reservation is determinative of tribal jurisdic-
tion; the relevant boundary in Worcester is that between tribal and 
state territory.326  Thus, we can only assume that Worcester’s dark side 
of the racial stereotyping is at work in the Long Family Land & Cattle 
majority decision, expanding the savagery language beyond the ste-
reotyping’s original use in Worcester to overshadow that case’s true 
holding. 
In addition to the difficulties that the holding in Long Family Land 
& Cattle poses for tribes,327 the tone of the decision is overtly dismis-
 
322 Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2724–25. 
323 Id. at 2723 (citing Worcester to support the proposition that “[b]y virtue of their incorpora-
tion into the United States, the tribe’s sovereign interests are now confined to managing 
tribal land”). 
324 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a dis-
tinct community occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no 
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the 
Cherokees themselves . . . .”). 
325 Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2723. 
326 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force . . . . The whole intercourse between the United States and this 
nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.”). 
327 See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 687–88 & n.171 (describing how Long Family Land & Cattle 
negatively impacts tribes’ ability to protect their governmental interests, specifically how 
inability to enforce anti-discrimination laws against non-members will lead to job and op-
portunity losses). 
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sive of tribes and tribal rights.328  Moreover, the analysis in the opi-
nion is often facile, avoiding the difficult task of truly applying the 
Court’s complicated Indian law precedents and announcing rules for 
the first time while proclaiming that they are well-established.329  
These aspects of the decision independently harm tribes and nega-
tively affect how society views them, affirming societal racialization of 
tribes.330 
B. The Continuing Stereotype of Indians as Savage May Also Be Driving 
the Federal Government’s Failure to Effectively Deal with Epidemic 
Levels of On-Reservation Violent Crime 
The continuing societal racialization of Indians and tribes and, 
specifically, the stereotype of savagery, undoubtedly has effects 
 
328 For instance, the Long Family Land & Cattle Court accuses the Longs of “attempt[ing] to 
recharacterize their claim,” 128 S. Ct. at 2720, although the alleged recharacterization is 
actually comprised of the Longs’ valid argument that the case arose out of the defen-
dant’s failure to provide them with promised loan moneys.  Additionally, the Court ap-
pears glib about federal actions, such as diminishing the reservation land-base by parce-
ling out the reservation pursuant to the General Allotment Act, that have undoubtedly 
caused untold grief for the tribe and its members.  For instance, the Court states that, al-
though the reservation was “[o]nce a massive, 60-million acre affair,” it “was appreciably 
diminished by Congress in the 1880s”  Id. at 2714–15.  At another point, the Court states:  
“[t]hanks to the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 . . . there are millions of acres of 
non-Indian fee land located” within reservations.  Id. at 2719.  The Court’s implicit ex-
pression of satisfaction that the federal government has inflicted these harms upon tribes 
can only indicate disrespect of their position and an utter lack of empathy towards them.  
Such language can be expected to further alienate tribes and make them even less likely 
to trust in the court system.  See Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening:  A Therapeu-
tic Analysis of the Role of Courts in Minority-Majority Conflicts, 37 COURT REV. 54, 57, 60, 60 
n.48 (2000) (arguing that courts must carefully choose “therapeutic” language to avoid 
exacerbating the tension between majority and minority groups). 
329 For instance, the Court focuses exclusively on the tribal court’s jurisdiction to enforce 
one of the remedies sought by the plaintiffs for the alleged discrimination, the setting 
aside of the bank’s subsequent sale of the land, rather than undertaking the required 
(and unquestionably more difficult) analysis of whether the tribal court had jurisdiction 
over the discrimination claim itself, for which the plaintiffs had sought both legal and 
equitable remedies.  See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 680.  The Court then sidesteps the 
applicability of the Montana exception by concluding that land sales are not activities 
within the meaning of Montana.  Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2722–23 & n.1 
(creating a distinction between land use and land sale).  Not only does the Court adopt 
this conclusion, which is questionable in itself, but it also avers, without any basis what-
soever, that “[t]he distinction between sale of land and conduct on it is well-established in 
our precedent.”  Id. at 2723. 
330 See, e.g., Des Rosiers, supra note 328, at 56–58, 59–60 (using a case study on Quebec to 
illustrate how lack of nuance in court language can exacerbate pre-existing tensions ra-
ther than resolve a conflict). 
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beyond the judicial abrogation of tribal sovereignty.331  One area 
where these stereotypes may well be at work is the federal govern-
ment’s failure, at least up to this point, to deal effectively with violent 
crime on reservations.  As I discussed in a previous article, American 
Indians are more often victimized by violent crime than any other 
group, and Native women are especially at risk.332  Indeed, Native 
women are 2.5 times more likely to be raped than other women, and 
one in three Native women will be raped in her lifetime.333  In a 2007 
report on the subject, Amnesty International found that “Indian 
women face considerable barriers to accessing justice,” and the or-
ganization charged the U.S. government with “interfer[ing] with the 
ability of tribal justice systems to respond to crimes of sexual vi-
olence.”334  Not only has tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
been abrogated, as we saw in Oliphant, but it appears that federal 
prosecutors, who are responsible in most states for prosecuting the 
majority of serious crimes on Indian reservations,335 rarely prosecute 
violent crime in Indian country.336  Thus, tribes are largely powerless 
to deal with this epidemic violence.  In other words, without the rec-
ognized sovereign powers over non-Indians that the Supreme Court, 
in cases such as Oliphant and Long Family Land & Cattle, has abro-
gated, tribes cannot defend themselves, and the federal government 
has failed, at least up until now, to effectively defend them. 
As noted above, a significant portion of this problem is attributa-
ble to Oliphant’s divestment of tribal criminal jurisdiction and the ste-
reotypes of savagery that are at play in that decision.337  Additionally, 
although several Senate Committee hearings have now been con-
ducted on the issue and legislation that takes limited steps to remedy 
 
331 See, e.g., supra note 239 and sources cited therein (discussing Spokesman Review articles and 
Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin). 
332 Tweedy, supra note 57, at 690 (discussing the rate of sexual violence against Native wom-
en and the obstacles they face when seeking justice). 
333 Id. at 689. 
334 Id. at 690–91 (citations omitted). 
335 Id. at 692–95 (discussing the Major Crimes Act’s grant of federal jurisdiction over enume-
rated felonies perpetrated by Indians and the Indian Country Crimes Act and Assimilative 
Crimes Act’s grants of federal jurisdiction over interracial on-reservation crimes that in-
volve both non-Indians and Indians); see supra notes 277-79 (discussion federal criminal 
jurisdiction). 
336 Id. at 691 (suggesting U.S. Attorneys prosecute as few as 15% of felony cases referred to 
them by tribal prosecutors). 
337 See Trachman, supra note 272, at 854 (noting that Oliphant played an important role in 
causing lawlessness on Indian reservations); Tweedy, supra note 57, at 684–95 (explaining 
the practical effects of the divestment of tribal sovereignty); see also Krakoff, supra note 
264, at 1111–12 (describing the effects of the federal government’s divestment of sove-
reignty on the Navajo Nation). 
754 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
the problem has recently passed,338 it is unclear why the problem was 
allowed to become so dire before meaningful steps were taken.  It 
may well be that the stereotypes of savagery at play in the decisions 
divesting tribal sovereignty have also been working to make the safety 
of Indian reservations such a low priority that some have credibly ac-
cused the federal government of genocide.339  In other words, it is en-
tirely possible that the current lawlessness on Indian reservations is a 
continuation of the pattern of unpunished vigilantism and de jure vi-
olence against Indians that was prevalent in colonial and early Ameri-
can periods.  America’s othering of Indians as savage, which stemmed 
largely from their acts of self-defense, may still be implicitly justify-
ing—or at least facilitating—the nation’s current failure to defend 
them—and failure to allow them to defend themselves—from perpe-
trators of on-reservation violent crime, including the predominantly 
non-Indian perpetrators of the rape of Indian women.340 
VI.  AMERICA NEEDS TO RECKON WITH ITS RACIALIZED HISTORY AND 
POTENTIALLY REEVALUATE THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND KEY INDIAN 
LAW PRECEDENTS 
A. The Implications of Heller for Indians on Reservation Lands Are Unclear 
First of all, tribes as governments need not provide Second 
Amendment protections to those within their jurisdiction.  This is be-
cause tribes, being neither state nor federal actors, are not required 
to provide constitutional rights to those within their jurisdiction.341  
Furthermore, the Indian Civil Rights Act342 includes no Second 
Amendment analog, despite its imposition of obligations on tribes to 
protect several rights that are framed in language similar to that of 
 
338 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 §§ 201–66, Pub. L. No. 111-211, (2010); see also Tweedy, 
supra note 57, at 709 (discussing Senate Committee on Indian Affairs hearings addressing 
law enforcement and administration on tribal lands). 
339 Tweedy, supra note 57, at 684 & n.160 (citing multiple sources that characterize divest-
ment as part of genocide). 
340 Tweedy, supra note 57, at 690 (reciting that 86% of the perpetrators of rape against In-
dian women are non-Indian men). 
341 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381–83 (1896) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States is a limitation only upon the powers of the General Govern-
ment. . .”); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation of S.D, 259 F.2d 553, 
556–57 (8th Cir. 1958) (“The Indian tribes are not, however, states and these Constitu-
tional limitations have no application to the actions, legislative in character, by Indian 
tribes.”). 
342 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–03 (2006). 
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the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights.343  Thus, tribes could enact their 
own restrictions on gun ownership irrespective of Heller, and it ap-
pears that a number of tribes do currently regulate gun ownership.344  
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, it is not entirely 
clear that the Court would interpret Heller to prohibit the federal 
government from banning firearms in Indian country.  The Supreme 
Court has held Congress to have exceedingly broad “plenary power” 
over tribes,345 and, at least partially as a result of this power, Indians 
(and tribes) have had mixed success when they have tried to enforce 
federal constitutional rights in the courts.346  Thus, it is a real possibil-
 
343 Id. § 1302 (listing several rights that may not be infringed by tribal governments, includ-
ing free exercise of religion, security against unreasonable search and seizures, and 
double jeopardy protections); Robert Laurence, Don’t Think of a Hippopotamus:  An Essay 
on First-Year Contracts, Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, the Indian Civil Rights 
Act, the Clean Water Act, and Justice Thomas’s Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 
TULSA L. REV. 137, 143 (2004) (noting differences between the ICRA and the Bill of 
Rights). 
344 See, e.g., Absentee-Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Okla., Res. No. AS-94-01 (Jan. 3, 1994), 
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/codes/absshaw/Crimoff.html (enacting a general ban 
on the carrying of firearms on the person “except as may otherwise be provided for in the 
Code of Laws of the Absentee-Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma”); see also Criminal Code Of-
fenses & Punishments, SILETZ TRIBAL CODE § 12.126 (1992) (amended 2005) (criminaliz-
ing the carrying of a machine gun without a federal license and defining other, similar of-
fenses). 
345 Tweedy, supra note 57, at 659–60 & nn.31 & 34 (discussing the plenary power doctrine). 
346 See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 14.03[2][a]; see 
also Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 440, 451 (1988) (holding that 
the Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the federal government from engaging in tim-
ber harvesting and road building on federal lands, even assuming that the federal activi-
ties would “virtually destroy the . . . Indians’ ability to practice their religion” (citation 
omitted)); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 644, 649 (1977) (denying Indian de-
fendants’ equal protection claim based on their having been tried under federal law for 
felony murder because they were Indians whose crime occurred on a reservation, whereas 
non-Indians who committed the same actions off-reservation would not be subject to 
murder charges under the applicable state’s laws); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 
348 U.S. 272, 284–85 (1955) (holding that a tribe is not entitled to compensation under 
the Fifth Amendment for a federal taking of timber on lands to which the tribe held ab-
original title); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1831) (holding that 
tribes are not “foreign nations” and therefore that they are not entitled to invoke the 
Court’s original jurisdiction in order to sue states); Washburn, supra note 157, at 751–55 
(describing federal courts of appeals cases in which Indian defendants have unsuccessful-
ly sought to enforce their Sixth Amendment rights regarding jury pool composition); id. 
at 715–16, 741–75 (describing the federal criminal justice framework for crimes that oc-
cur in Indian country, and arguing that this framework may well violate several constitu-
tional rights of Indian defendants and their respective tribal communities, including 
rights based on the Sixth Amendment and those existing under the First Amendment); 
cf. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 5.04[2][c] (explaining 
that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause does apply to federal takings of Indian lands in 
cases where the federal government had previously recognized Indian title).  See generally 
Singer, supra note 255, at 43–47 (explaining how the government’s non-consensual al-
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ity that, despite Heller, the Court would uphold a federal firearms ban 
that applied to Indians on reservations.  This possibility demonstrates 
the uncertainty that even today surrounds Indians’ attempts to en-
force the constitutional rights afforded to everyone else in the popu-
lace, including the individual right to self-defense enunciated in Hel-
ler.  Additionally, if tribes were to assert a collective right to self-
defense against some sort of armed attack by the United States, an 
individual state, or some other entity, it seems almost certain that a 
federal court, in accordance with the examples from American histo-
ry discussed above, would hold that no such right existed, most likely 
because it was implicitly divested by virtue of tribes’ dependent sta-
tus.347  To put this example in concrete terms, imagine that, as a GOP 
delegate advocated in 2000,348 the United States armed forces were 
summoned to go onto reservations and forcibly dismantle tribal gov-
ernments.  Would tribes be held to have a legal right to fight back?  
Probably not.  Thus, despite the Second Amendment’s intent to pro-
tect against federal tyranny, a goal that many see as archaic today, In-
dian tribes remain under the shackles of federal tyranny in the form 
of congressional plenary power and the decisions of a Supreme Court 
that often appears openly hostile to their sovereign rights. 
Not only do tribes lack a right to self-defense in the sense that they 
are still being punished for past acts of self-defense, and in that the 
incursions on their sovereignty that constitute this punishment rend-
er them unable to defend themselves against outsider depredations, 
but it is also uncertain whether individual Indians on reservations can 
reap the benefits of Heller.  Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that a 
tribe could successfully assert a collective right to self-defense. 
B. Where to Go from Here? 
What does the troubled relationship detailed above between In-
dians and non-Indians mean for the Second Amendment?  Regard-
 
lotment of tribal property, as sanctioned by the Court in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 
553 (1903), constituted a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
347 See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 659 (describing the origins of the doctrine of implicit 
divestiture); see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet,) at 17–18 (“[A]ny attempt [by a for-
eign nation] to acquire . . . [tribal] lands, or to form a political connexion 
with . . . [Indian tribes located within the United States], would be considered by all as an 
invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.”); supra note 251 and accompanying text 
(addressing Oliphant’s use of the doctrine).  One practical illustration of tribes’ lack of a 
collective right to self-defense is that tribes with reservations near an international border 
were left out of the federal Homeland Security funding scheme.  See generally Jim Adams, 
Homeland Security Funding a Disgrace, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 2, 2004). 
348 See supra note 239 (discussing Spokesman Review articles). 
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less of whether the Heller Court is correct as a historical matter that 
the Amendment was intended to incorporate an individual right to 
bear arms, the Amendment itself is based in significant part on our 
gross misperceptions of Indians.  This is because if the Amendment is 
militia-based, as the collective rights view and the traditional indivi-
dualist view understand it to be, then a racialized view of Indians is 
inherent in the fact that the militias were originally designed to de-
fend against what were perceived as tribal acts of unprovoked, savage 
aggression (although in fact the Indians were in many cases defend-
ing themselves and their property).  Moreover, Heller’s latter-day indi-
vidualist conception is based in part on the Pennsylvania Declaration 
of Rights, a document that historically stemmed from racialized con-
ceptions of tribes.  Additionally, the Heller Court appears to have only 
been able to conceive of tribes in a one-dimensional, racialized way—
as a force to defend against.  Thus, under any of the dominant inter-
pretations of the Amendment, it is infused with racialized percep-
tions of Indians. 
This problem is different and deeper than that involving other 
rights, such as voting, that were originally applied in discriminatory 
ways.  This is because the Second Amendment itself incorporates our 
conception of the other; in other words, the right could not logically 
exist unless there were some other “bad” group that the good ups-
tanding citizens needed to defend themselves from, either as a militia 
or on an individual basis.349  Without this other, the Amendment 
would be considered obsolete, a mere relic of history.  Instead, the 
Amendment and the rights it is thought to encompass excite a great 
deal of passion and controversy.  Nonetheless, despite this problem 
and the arguments of some scholars that the Amendment should be 
considered legally defunct, at this point in time, it is not realistic to 
consider amending the Constitution to remove the Amendment, and 
even if the Amendment were repealed, the stereotypes of savagery 
would continue to do dangerous work in other contexts.  Thus, we 
must start unraveling these stereotypes now.  We must take a serious 
look at our history, and we must question all our assumptions about 
tribes and Indians. 
Moreover, this reevaluation must be undertaken not just with re-
spect to the right of self-defense, viewed narrowly, and the Second 
Amendment, but also with respect to key Indian law precedents that 
affect tribal self-defense in a broader sense.  To the extent that these 
precedents are substantively affected by notions of savagery (and 
 
349 See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 1; Bogus, supra note 9. 
758 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
many appear to be), they should not be relied upon, particularly in 
deciding issues of tribal sovereignty.  And care should be taken to 
protect tribal and individual Indians’ constitutional rights.  At least in 
cases where there is no conflict between a tribe’s sovereignty and an 
individual Indian’s asserted constitutional right,350 there is no reason 
to afford Indians or tribes any less protection for their constitutional 
rights than anyone else. 
While a detailed solution to these problems is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it is clear that denigrating legal fictions, such as Johnson’s 
holding that the United States gained underlying fee title to tribal 
lands by virtue of discovering them and Tee-Hit-Ton’s holding that the 
United States does not owe tribes Fifth Amendment compensation 
for the taking of aboriginal title because tribes are conquered 
peoples, must be eschewed.  Moreover, limitations on tribal jurisdic-
tion, such as those effected by Oliphant and Long Family Land & Cattle, 
that are implicitly grounded on notions of tribal untrustworthiness 
with respect to outsiders likely stem from racialized conceptions of 
Indians and should be regarded as inherently suspect.  Although jus-
tice for tribes and Indians may be difficult to even envision in the face 
of hundreds of years of largely unjust precedent and, in many cases, 
positive law, we must dare to imagine it and then collectively demand 
it of ourselves, our courts, and our government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
350 In the relatively rare case where a tribe’s right to self-government conflicted with an indi-
vidual’s Constitutional right, one solution might be to define the tribe’s right to self-
government as a compelling interest.  However, I am not suggesting that such a solution 
be applied in the context of ICRA-based individual rights, which are statutory rather than 
constitutional.  A more thorough examination of this proposed solution would be neces-
sary before it could be unequivocally supported. 
